The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver by Podkopacz, Marcy Rasmussen & Feld, Barry C
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1996 
The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver 
Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz 
Barry C. Feld 
University of Minnesota Law School, feldx001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1996), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/
faculty_articles/373. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
00914169/96/8602-0449
THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY VoL 86, No. 2
Copyright © 1996 by Northwestern University, School of Law Pintd ia U.S.A.
THE END OF THE LINE: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF JUDICIAL WAIVER
MARCY RASMUSSEN PODKOPACZ*
BARRY C. FELD**
I. INTRODUCTION
When young offenders commit serious or violent offenses, should
the justice system respond on the basis of "just deserts" or on the "real
needs" of the offender? Waiver decisions-affecting the most serious
or persistent juvenile offenders-require a sentencing policy choice
between punishment in adult criminal court or rehabilitation in juve-
nile court.' If one adopts a criminal court's point of view, the empha-
sis on punishment prevails, and the seriousness of the present offense
or one's prior record controls the decision to transfer adolescents
from juvenile to adult court. When offense considerations dominate,
transfer decisions lend themselves to relatively mechanical decisional
rules or presumptive sentencing guidelines. Alternatively, if one
adopts ajuvenile court's point of view, the emphasis on rehabilitation
predominates, and individualized assessments of an offender's "ame-
nability to treatment," "dangerousness," and future welfare control
the sentencing decision. When offender characteristics are para-
mount, courts require more open-ended, indeterminate, and discre-
tionary processes.2
* Senior Statistical Analyst with Hennepin County Department of Community Correc-
tions. MA (Sociology) 1985, University of Minnesota; Currently a Ph.D. candidate in the
Department of Sociology at the University of Minnesota.
** Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. BA 1966, University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D. 1969, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. (Sociology) 1973, Harvard
University. Former Assistant Hennepin County Attorney injuvenile and criminal divisions.
Served as member and Due Process Sub-Committee Co-Chair of 1992-94 MinnesotaJuve-
nile Justice Task Force. Served as Co-Reporter 1994-96 Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Procedure for Juvenile Court to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
1 Courts analogize waiver decisions to sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Kent v. United
States 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (stating that it is a "critically important action"); In re S.R.J., 293
N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 1980) ("A reference hearing is a dispositional hearing."); In re D.M.,
373 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn.
1981) ("A reference hearing is a dispositional type hearing which is forward looking.").
2 See generaly NORVAL MoRRmS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 13-20 (1974); HERBERT
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 54-55 (1968); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING
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The recent increase in youth violence has provoked legislative re-
actions to "get tough" or to find the "right" solution. Every state has
adopted one or more statutory strategy to transfer some chronological
juveniles to criminal courts. The alternatives include: (1) judicial
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction; (2) legislative exclusion of spe-
cific offenses from jurisdiction in juvenile court;3 and (3) prosecu-
torial choice of forum between concurrent jurisdictions in deciding
whether a youth is a criminal or a delinquent.4
Judicial waiver is the most common waiver mechanism across the
nation.5 Ajuvenile court judge may waive juvenile court jurisdiction
on a discretionary basis after a hearing to determine whether a youth
is "amenable to treatment" or poses a threat to public safety. A
judge's case-by-case clinical assessment of a youth's rehabilitative po-
tential and dangerousness reflects the individualized sentencing dis-
cretion characteristic of juvenile courts.6
Proponents ofjudicial waiver emphasize its consistency with juve-
nile court sentencing philosophy and contend that individualized
judgments provide an appropriate balance of flexibility and severity.7
By contrast, critics argue that juvenile courts lack valid or reliable
JUSTICE 11-26 (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES; DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV.
821, 847-91 (1988).
S DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS 96-97
(1982); MELISSA SICKMUND, HOWJUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT (1994). See, e.g., Barry
C. Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 523 n.22 (1978); HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA
SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VtCrms: A NATIONAL REPORT 84-89 (1995) (summariz-
ing juvenile court transfer laws).
4 Legislative waiver, or offense exclusion, emphasizes the seriousness of the offense
committed and reflects the retributive values of the criminal law. Because legislatures cre-
ate juvenile courts, they possess considerable latitude to define its jurisdiction in various
ways, and to exclude youths from juvenile court on the basis of their age and certain of-
fenses. With prosecutorial waiver strategy, both juvenile and criminal courts share concur-
rent jurisdiction over certain offenses, and a prosecutor's decision to charge a youth in
juvenile or criminal court determines the forum. To the extent that a prosecutor's discre-
tion to charge the case in criminal courts divests the juvenile court ofjurisdiction, however,
this waiver mechanism is often treated as a variant of offense decision-making.
5 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 3, at 84-89; Erick Fristch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile
Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46
Juv. & FAm. CT.J. 17 (1995).
6 See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) (analysis of juvenile
court waiver legislation).
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17
CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 93 (1990); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in Ameri-
can Juvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
267 (1991).
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clinical tools with which to assess amenability to treatment or to pre-
dict dangerousness, and that the standardless discretion courts exer-
cise results in abuses and inequalities.8
As the public debate about serious and violent delinquents inten-
sifies, legislatures increasingly exclude certain combinations of pres-
ent offense and prior record from juvenile court jurisdiction or
emphasize offense criteria to structure judicial discretion in waiver
hearings.9 Despite these legislative modifications of the most conse-
quential sentencing decisions juvenile courts make, there is remarka-
bly little research on the determinants of waiver, the sentences that
young offenders received in juvenile or criminal courts, or their subse-
quent criminal careers.' 0
This Article addresses this paucity with an analysis of judicial
waiver policy and processes in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), the
largest metropolitan county in Minnesota. First, we discuss the legal
framework for judicial waiver decisions and describe prior research on
waiver practices. Second, we explore significant determinants of the
waiver decision, analyzing 330 transfer motions filed between 1986
and 1992 to identify the offender and offense variables that affectjudi-
cial waiver decisions. In our analysis we include indicators of the judi-
cial waiver process, including: the timing of the process, the role of
clinical assessments, and the ways in which individual judges affect
transfer decisions. Finally, we examine the subsequent juvenile or
criminal court processing, sentencing, and recidivism of youths
against whom prosecutors filed waiver motions.
II. JUDICIAL WAIVER
Two United States Supreme Court cases provide the constitu-
tional framework for making the individualized sentencing decisions
involved in judicial waiver hearings. In Kent v. United States," the
Court held that states must provide juveniles with some procedural
8 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinants ofJudicidal Waiver
Decisionfor VolentJuvenile Offenders, 81J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314 (1990) (inconsistent
application of transfer laws); Feld, supra note 3, at 529-56 (juvenile court judges lack valid
or reliable clinical tools with which to make accurate amenability diagnoses or dangerous-
ness predictions); Feld, supra note 6, at 489; Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases:
Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAw & INEQ.
J. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Bad Law Makes Hard Cases] (standardless discretion results in in-
consistent decisions and justice by geography).
9 Compare Feld, supra note 6, at 489 with DANJ. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFER-
RINGJUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURT (1991); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 3, at 85 (docu-
menting changes in waiver legislation between 1986 and 1994).
10 HowARD N. SNYmER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICrIMS: A Focus
ON VIOLENcE (1995).
11 3883 U.S. 541 (1966).
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due process protections in judicial waiver hearings, thereby "formaliz-
ing" this special sentencing decision. 12 In Breed v. Jones,13 the Court
applied the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution to the ad-
judication of juvenile offenses and required states to decide whether
to try a youth in juvenile or criminal court before proceeding on the
merits of the charge. 14
Although Kent and Breed provide the procedural framework for
judicial waiver decisions, the substantive bases for these decisions pose
much greater difficulties. Most jurisdictions allow juvenile court
judges to waive jurisdiction based on assessments of a youth's danger-
ousness or amenability to treatment. These discretionary decisions fo-
cus on the offender's age, the amount of time left for treatment
within juvenile jurisdiction, treatment prognosis as reflected in
clinical evaluations, and threat to others as reflected in the seriousness
of the present offense and prior record. 15
Asking the court to decide whether a youth is dangerous or ame-
nable to treatment implicates some of the most difficult issues of sen-
tencing policy and juvenile jurisprudence. The underlying legislative
assumptions-that effective treatment programs exist for serious or
persistent juvenile offenders, that classification systems can differenti-
ate the treatment potential or dangerousness of various youth, and
that validated and reliable diagnostic tools enable a clinician orjuve-
12 Id. at 554. In Kent, the Supreme Court concluded that the loss of the special protec-
tions of the juvenile court-private proceedings, confidential records, and protection from
the stigma of a criminal conviction-through a waiver decision was a "critically important7
action that required a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations and
other records, and written findings and conclusions capable of review by a higher court.
Id. at 554-57. "[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tre-
mendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance
of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554; see generally Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent
v. United States: The Constitutional Context ofJuvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. Or. REy. 167 (1966).
13 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
14 In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court held that the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited adult criminal reprosecution
of a youth after a prior conviction in juvenile court. At issue was the applicability of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to state proceedings, and the Court re-
solved the question by establishing a functional equivalence between an adult criminal trial
and a delinquency proceeding. The Court described the virtually identical interests impli-
cated in a delinquency hearing and a traditional criminal prosecution--"'anxiety and inse-
curity,'" a "'heavy personal strain,'" and the increased burdens as the juvenile system
became more procedurally formalized. Id at 530-31 (quoting Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187 (1957); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)). In light of the
potential consequences of a delinquency proceeding, the Court concluded that there was
little basis to distinguish it from a traditional adult criminal prosecution. Id. at 530.
15 See Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 8; Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal
Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 198 (1983) [hereinafter De-
linquent Careers]; Feld, supra note 3, at 526; Feld, supra note 5, at 490. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT.
§ 260.125 (1988).
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nile court to determine the proper disposition for a particular
youth-are all highly problematic and controversial. 16 Alternatively,
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction because a youth poses a threat to
public safety assumes that courts reliably and accurately can predict
future dangerousness.' 7
Juvenile courts exercise broad, standardless discretion when mak-
ing waiver decisions on the basis of statutory criteria such as amenabil-
ity to treatment or dangerousness.' 8 Adding long lists of amorphous
and contradictory substantive factors, such as the standards appended
in Kent, reinforces rather than constrains judicial discretion because
courts can justify any decision by selectively emphasizing one set of
attributes over another.19
The subjective nature of waiver decisions allows unequal applica-
tion of the law to similarly situated youths without any effective check.
Juvenile courts cannot administer these discretionary statutes on a
consistent, even-handed basis.20 Hamparian's nationwide analysis of
waiver in 1978 provides compelling evidence thatjudicial waiver prac-
tices are inherently arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.2' In ad-
16 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 3, at 529-46; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform
and the Serious Young Offender Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Idea," 65 MINN. L. REv. 167
(1981) [hereinafter Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal"]; Feld, Delinquent Careers, supra note
15, at 198-202; Feld, supra note 6, at 489; Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case
Study ofJuvenileJustice Law Reform, 79 MnN. L. REv. 965 (1995) [hereinafter Violent Youth
and Public Policy].
17 Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness in the Criminal Law, 6 CRIME
&JUST. 1 (1985); Feld, supra note 3, at 540-46.
18 Franklin E. Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in READINGS IN PUBLC
PoLIcY 193 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) (waiver of serious juvenile offenders as "the
capital punishment ofjuvenile justice").
19 "Collectively, 'lists' of this length rarely serve to limit discretion or regularize proce-
dure. By giving emphasis to one or two of the guidelines, a judge can usually justify a
decision either way." TAsK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 56 (1978). Zimring notes that
"[T]he substantive standards are highly subjective, and the large number of factors that
may be taken into consideration provides ample opportunity for selection and emphasis in
discretionary decisions that shape the outcome of individual cases." Zimring, supra note
18, at 195.
20 See infra note 41 and accompanying text, analyzing empirical data of transfer deci-
sion in Minnesota in 1986. See generally HAmPARAwN -r At., supra note 8; Fagan &
Deschenes, supra note 8, at 845-47 (no strong or consistent determinants ofjudicial trans-
fer decisions); Feld, supra note 8, at 546-56.
21 HAMPARLAN ET A., supra note 3, at 102-07. Among the states that rely on judicial
waiver for the transfer decision, the rates of waiver vary from a high of 13.5 to a low of .07
per 10,000 youths at risk; youths in Oregon have nearly 200 times the probability of being
waived for trial as adults as do youths in Montana. Id. at 102-08.
Fagan and Deschenes analyzed waiver decisions involving a sample of violent youths in
four differentjurisdictions and concluded that there were no uniform criteria guiding the
transfer decision:
What we found was a rash of inconsistent judicial waiver decisions, both within and
PODKOPACZ & FELD[
dition, a juvenile's race may also influence the waiver decision. 22
Furthermore,Jeffrey Fagan reports that the length of time from age at
offense to the jurisdictional age limit, rather than the offender's prior
record, strongly influences judicial transfer decisions; courts transfer
juveniles where the seriousness of the offense requires a longer sen-
tence than is available in the juvenile court.2 3
A second problem posed by discretionary waiver is the inconsis-
tency between the criteria used to make transfer decisions and the
criteria used by criminal courts to impose prison sentences. Despite
public concerns in many jurisdictions about youth violence, most
youths judicially waived to criminal court are chronic property offend-
ers rather than violent offenders.2 4 When criminal courts sentence
recidivist property offenders who appear as adult first-offenders, these
youths often receive shorter sentences as adults than they could have
received in juvenile court.25 This lack of integration between juvenile
court waiver and criminal court sentencing practices gives rise to a
across sites. Inconsistent and standardless decisions for youths retained in the juvenile
court are not surprising in ajudicial context that cherishes individualized justice....
But for youth who may be tried and convicted in criminal court and subjected to years
of imprisonment in a secure institution, such subjective decision-making is no longer
justified.
Fagan & Deschenes, supra note 8, at 347.
Fagan and Deschenes tested seven offense and offender variables to identify determi-
nants of the transfer decision within a sample of violent youths. They report that
"[n] either multivariate analysis nor simple explorations identified strong or consistent de-
terminants of the judicial transfer decision. Except for a relationship between extensive
prior offense history and the transfer decision, none of the identified variables could signif-
icantly describe differences between youths who were or were not transferred." Id. at 345.
22 See generalyJoel Eigen, The Determinants and Impact ofJurisdictional Transfer in Philadel-
phia, in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 18, at 339-40 (Eigen reports an interracial
effect in transfers: black youths who murder white victims are significantly more at risk for
waiver); HAMPARIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 104-05 (Hamparian reported that nationally,
39% of all youths transferred in 1978 were black and that in 11 states, minority youths
constituted the majority ofjuveniles waived); Robert Keiter, Criminal orDelinquent: A Study
ofJuvenile Cases Transferred to the Criminal Court, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 528 (1973).
Fagan's study of transfer of violent youths also found substantial disparities in the rates
of minority and white offenders. Although there was no direct evidence of sentencing
discrimination, "it appears that the effects of race are indirect, but visible nonetheless."
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent
Youth in Criminal Court 33 CRIME & DELrNQ. 259, 276 (1987). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS
(Aug. 1995) (courts waived blacks more often than whites for violent, property, and drug
crimes).
23 Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 16, at 1014.
24 See, e.g., SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 3; Feld, supra note 6; Feld, Violent Youth and
Public Policy, supra note 16, at 1011-12.
25 See, e.g., Margaret A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of
Juveniles to Adult Cour4 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986); L. Kay Gillespie and Michael D.
Norman, Does Certification Mean Prison: Some Preliminary Findings from Utah, 35 Juv. & FAM.
CT.J. 23 (1984).
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"punishment gap" when chronic young offenders make the transition
from one system to the other.
A. JUDICIAL WAIVER IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota's judicial waiver statutes, criteria, and procedures typ-
ify the way most states decide to prosecute some chronological
juveniles in criminal courts. Subject to the constitutional constraints
of Kent and Breed, Minnesota's statute and Juvenile Court Rule 3226
govern the process of waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and prosecut-
ing a young offender as an adult. The county attorney initiates a ref-
erence proceeding by filing a motion for adult prosecution.2 7
Following a finding of probable cause, the juvenile court may order a
social study of the child 28 and within thirty days of filing the motion
must conduct a hearing to determine whether the youth meets the
26 At the time of this studyjuvenile courtjudges could waive a youth if they found that
"the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety is not served" by retaining
the youth in juvenile court. MiNN. STAT. §260.125(d) (2) (1994). MiNN. R. P. Juv. Or.
32.05 (2) elaborates a nonexclusive list of the "totality of the circumstances" that ajuvenile
court may consider in determining a youth's dangerousness or amenability to treatment:
(a) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
(b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
(c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or will-
ful manner,
(d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the greater weight
being given to an offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted,
(e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
(f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the juvenile
treatment system,
(g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the
child's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living,
(h) the record and previous history of the child,
(i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of
another,
(j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning by the
child, and
(k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches age nineteen
(19) to provide appropriate treatment and control.
See also supra note 2; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (In an appendix to
its opinion, the Court indicated some of the substantive criteria that ajuvenile court might
consider.). The above listed criteria mirror the criteria listed in the Kent appendix.
27 MiNN. STAT. §260.125(2) (1994). Rule 32 provides: "Proceedings to refer a delin-
quency matter... may be initiated only upon motion of the county attorney after a delin-
quency petition has been filed." MINN. R. P.Juv. Or. 32.01; seeIn re Sweats, 293 N.W.2d 67,
70 (Minn. 1980) (decision whether to prosecute as an adult is within discretion of
prosecutor).
28 The rule provides: "If probable cause has been shown, pursuant to Rule 19.03 or
Rule 32.05, Subd. 1, the court, on its own motion or on the motion of the child's counsel
or the county attorney, may order a social, psychiatric or psychological study concerning
the child who is the subject of the reference." MNN. K P. Juv Or. 32.03. The rule also
provides that the social report is to be paid for "at public expense," shall be filed 48 hours
before the time scheduled for the hearing, and must be made available to both parties. Id
19961
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waiver criteria.29 The juvenile court may grant adult reference if it
concludes that the child is "not suitable for treatment" or that "public
safety is not served" by retaining the youth in juvenile court.30
Prior to 1980, Minnesota's waiver law provided minimal guidance
forjuvenile courts trying to decide whether to certify a youth for crim-
inal prosecution. In In re Dah4s3 the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
fronted some of the procedural and substantive problems in the
juvenile waiver process.3 2 The court clearly indicated to the legisla-
ture that the waiver criteria needed modification and greater specific-
ity,3 3 concluding that "re-evaluation of the existing certification
process may be in order."34
In 1980, the Minnesota legislature amended the certification pro-
29 MINN. R. P. Juv. CT. 32.01.
30 MINN. R. P.Juv. CT. 32.05(2) (1994); seeMINN. STAT. § 260.125 (2) (d) (Supp. 1983).
For a general discussions of the waiver procedure in Minnesota, see Feld, Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Idea, "supra note 16; Feld, supra note 3.
31 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979). The court commented that "'it is clearly apparent
that [Dahl] is not the typical delinquent seen by the Juvenile Court. This offense [first
degree murder] ... appears to be an isolated delinquent act.'" Id. at 317-18.
32 See id. at 321. In State v. Hogan, the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that the
presence of several criteria, including consideration of the offense allegedly committed,
allowed the lower court to certify a youth on public safety grounds. 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-
70 (Minn. 1973). The Supreme Court subsequently incorporated the Hogan and Kent crite-
ria into Rule 32.05 (2) of the Minnesota Rules of Procedure forJuvenile Court. SeeBarry C.
Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV.
141, 266-72 (1984); see also In reJ.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn. 1978) ("Although the
nature of the offense is certainly a factor to be considered in this determination and may
serve as a basis for statutory reference . . . this court has not held that reference is
mandatory when a serious crime is involved.").
33 See Dah4 278 N.W.2d at 318. Despite its concern about the adequacy of the stan-
dards, in 1983 the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated rules of procedure for juvenile
courts that included a list of factors courts should consider in making waiver decisions. See
MINN. R. P. Juv. Crs. § 32.05(2) (1992). These factors were drawn from Hogan, 212
N.W.2d at 669-70; and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 app. (1966).
When the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted Rule 32, Feld strongly criticized it for
failing to address the deficiencies of which it clearly was aware. In his critique, he noted:
The catalogue of miscellaneous factors promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court
provides neither a "central guiding principle" nor much practical guidance to juvenile
court judges struggling with this difficult sentencing decision. Instead, Rule 32's em-
phasis on vague, discretionary, and ultimately unquantifiable factors simply com-
pounds all the preexisting problems of the process and submits the most important
dispositional decision in the juvenile court to the subjective reaction of each individ-
ual juvenile court judge.
Feld, supra note 32, at 272.
34 Dahl 278 N.W.2d at 319. The Dahl court observed that "the standards for referral
adopted by present legislation are not very effective in making this important determina-
tion." Id. at 318. The court went on to note that "[d]ue to these difficulties in making the
waiver decision, many juvenile court judges have tended to be overcautious, resulting in
the referral of delinquent children for criminal prosecution on the erroneous, albeit good
faith, belief that the juveniles pose a danger to the public." Id. at 319.
[Vol. 86
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cess.35 The revised juvenile code retained, unchanged, the basic
waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment or dangerousness,3 6
and placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to establish by
"clear and convincing evidence" that juvenile court jurisdiction
should be waived.3 7 However, the legislature added a third subdivi-
sion to the certification statute3 8 to enable prosecutors to establish a
prima fade case, or rebuttable presumption, of nonamenability and
dangerousness by proving that a youth possessed various combina-
tions of present offense and prior record.3 9 Despite the legislative at-
tempt to use offense criteria to rationalize waiver decisions, the
rebuttable presumption strategy did not reduce judicial discretion.40
35 See generaly Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 16, at 192-239 (ana-
lyzing 1980 legislative changes in certification).
36 Mn'N. STAT. § 260.125(2) provides:
[T]he juvenile court may order a reference only if:
d) The court finds that
(1) there is probable cause... to believe the child committed the offense alleged
by delinquency petition and
(2) the prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety is not served under the
provisions of laws relating to juvenile courts.
MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1992) (emphasis added).
37 MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (1992); Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Idea4 " supra
note 16, at 205-07.
38 The legislature adopted an offense matrix that establishes a primafacie case for certi-
fication under the amenability and dangerousness provisions when various combinations
of a youth's present offense and/or prior record are present. Under the amended statute,
the prosecution can establish a primafacie case of both nonamenability and dangerousness
simply by proving that the juvenile is at least 16 years of age, that the present crime
charged is a serious offense, and that the combination of the present crime charged and
the prior record brings the case within one of the subdivision's clauses. See MIN. STAT.
§ 260.125 (3) (1992); see generaly Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal, "supra note 16 at
194-95 n.96. But see 1994 Lws OF MiNNESOTA CH. 576 (legislation repeals § 260.125 (3)).
39 MINN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1992); see Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Idea4 " supra
note 16, at 207-14.
40 Feld has noted the following.
[A] prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of produc-
ing substantial, controverting evidence to the party opposing the primafacie case ....
If substantial, countervailing evidence is presented. then the matter is to be deter-
mined by the trier of fact on the basis of the entire record and not by reference to the
prima facie case .... Functionally, then, the procedural operation of a primafacie case
is equivalent to a presumption in civil actions.
Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 16, at 209-10.
Several subsequent Minnesota court decisions endorsed Feld's analysis. See, e.g., In re
J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1982) (when state has established a prima facie case which
the defense rebutted with substantial evidence, court must decide waiver issue on basis of
the entire record, not simply by reference to the primafacie case); In re Givens, 307 N.W.2d
489 (Minn. 1981) (unrebutted prima facie case authorizes reference on both grounds of
nonamenability and dangerousness); In re KIJ.K, 357 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (where a prima fade case is not established, the court must consider totality of
circumstances).
1996] 457
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Evaluations of Minnesota's waiver process before and after the
1980 legislative amendments characterized judicial waiver decisions as
idiosyncratic, geographically variable, and in conflict with criminal
court sentencing practices. 41 These studies consistently found that
the largest group of juveniles waived to adult court throughout Min-
nesota were property offenders, not violent offenders, and that the
criteria for transfer differed between urban and rural jurisdictions.42
Moreover, because waived juveniles committed less serious offenses
and had less extensive criminal history scores, they often received
shorter sentences in adult courts than they could have received in ju-
venile court.
B. MINNESOTA'S JUDICIAL WAIVER IN CONTEXT
Although violent crime comprises a much smaller component
than property crime of the overall serious crime index as reported by
the FBI, the rates of juvenile violence have surged dramatically since
the mid-1980s. While nationally, Index Property Crime by juveniles
41 From 1975 to 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court's Study Commission found that
juvenile courtjudges' discretion frequently yielded pronounced differences in certification
outcomes in urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota. JUVENILE JusTIcE STUDY
COMM'N, MINN. SUPREME COURT, REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT (Nov. 1976).
Shortly after the Minnesota legislature amended the transfer statutes in 1980, the Supreme
Court Study Commission reexamined certification practices. It reported that in 1979, 1980,
and 1981: (1) very few rural juveniles met the prima facie case criteria; (2) prosecutors in
urban counties did not file reference motions against manyjuveniles who met the criteria;
and (3) two-thirds of the youths referred to adult criminal courts did not meet the pre-
sumptive criteria. JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, MINN. SUPREME COURT, CHANGING
BOUNDARIES OF THE JUVENILE COURT. PRACTICE AND POLICY IN MINNESOTA (Mar. 1982)
In a study that examined juvenile court data from 1986, Professor Barry Feld com-
pared the present offense, prior records, and treatment histories of juveniles waived to
criminal court with all delinquents who remained in juvenile courts. Feld reported that
judges waived most youths for property offenses rather than for crimes against the person,
and that urban-rural geographic disparities continued. However, the multivariate analyses
could explain very little of the variance (only 3.1%) in the differences between waived
youths and the remaining juvenile offenders. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 8,
at 37-40.
42 In 1992, the Minnesota legislature created an Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile
Justice System to examine the certification process and recommend changes in the waiver
statutes. TheJuvenile Justice Task Force conducted several studies of waiver practices and
the criminal court sentences of waived juvenile offenders. Despite public fears of youth
violence, prosecutors charged the majority ofjuveniles certified to stand trial as adults in
Minnesota in 1992 with property offenses; juvenile courts waived only about one-third
(35%) of youths for crimes against the person. The Juvenile Justice Task Force also ex-
amined the sentences imposed upon waived juveniles who were convicted of felonies in
adult court. Consistent with the waiver data, the majority ofjuveniles (62% in 1991) sen-
tenced as adults were property offenders. By virtue of prosecutorial and judicial selection,
the relatively few waived juveniles typically were convicted of more serious offenses than all
adult felons, yet they experienced a lower rate of imprisonment than did adults. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 16.
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increased 11% between 1983 and 1992, violent crime increased by
57%.43 In a special section onJuveniles and Violence in 1991, the FBI
reports that:
In 1990, the Nation experienced its highestjuvenile violent crime arrest
rate, 430 per 100,000juveniles .... The 1990 rate was 27% higher than
the 1980 rate .... Of particular note is the upward trend that started in
1988 for both white and black youth .... In 1990, the juvenile violent
crime arrest rate reached 1,429 per 100,000 black juveniles, five times
that for white youths. 44
The most frightening change in juvenile crime patterns is the in-
crease in murder rates accompanying the proliferation of guns among
youths.45 The murder arrest rate for juveniles increased over 300% in
the twenty-five years between 1965 and 1990. In 1990, African-Ameri-
can juveniles' arrest rate for homicide was 7.5 times higher than that
of whitejuveniles. Additionally, the number ofjuveniles who use guns
to commit murder has increased 79% in the last decade; "[i]n 1990,
nearly 3 of 4juvenile murder offenders used guns to perpetrate their
crimes."46 Although chronological juveniles only account for about
one murder arrest in seven,47 the dramatic rise in homicide by mid- to
late-adolescents, the racial concentration of perpetrators and victims
of violence, and arrests of increasingly younger juveniles for violence
certainly justify public concerns. 48
43 See Howard N. Snyder, 1992Juvenile Arrests (OJJDP Fact Sheet, May 1994). 1992 FBI
Uniform Crime Report data indicate thatjuveniles account for almost 18% of all arrests for
violent crime and about 33% of all property crimes. Juvenile property crime arrests in-
creased by 8% between 1988 and 1992, and by 11% between 1983 and 1992. Id.
44 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE U.S.: 1991,
UNIFORM CRIME REP., at 1, 279 (1992) [hereinafter FBI, UCR: 1991].
45 Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the illit-Drug Industly, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995) (analyzing changing patterns of age-specific homicide rates in con-
junction with proliferation of guns and illegal drug industry).
46 FBI, UCR: 1991, supra note 44, at 279.
47 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE U.S.: 1992,
UNIFORM CRIME RaP., at 1, 227 (1993) [herinafter FBI, UCR: 1992] (Juvenile homicide
arrests accounted for about 14.5% of all murder arrests; juveniles were arrested for 2,829
murders while adults over 18 years of age were arrested for 16,662 murders.) Id. These
arrest rates may overstate somewhat juveniles' violent criminal involvement since youths,
more than adults, tend to commit their crimes in groups, and one criminal event may
produce several juvenile arrests. See Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some Im-
plications of a Well-Known Secret, 72J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 868-75 (1981).
48 See FBI, UCR. 1992, supra note 47, at 227; BARBARA ALLEN-HAGEN Er AL., JUVENILES
AND VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDING AND VICTIMIZATION (1994) ("Between 1988 and 1992,
the number of Violent Crime Index arrests of juveniles increased by 47%-more than
twice the increase for persons 18 years of age or older. Most alarming, juvenile arrests for
murder increased by 51%, compared to 9% for adults."); Peter W. Greenwood, Juvenile
Crime and JuvenileJustice, in CRIME 91, 96 (James Q. Wilson &Joan Petersilia eds., 1995)
("In 1980, juveniles accounted for just 10% of all arrests for homicide. By 1990, juveniles
accounted for 13.6% of all homicide arrests. Between 1984 and 1992 the number of
juveniles arrested for homicide, who were under the age of fifteen, increased by 50%.").
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Changes in Minnesota's racial composition affect both crime
rates and political reactions to youth and crime. Only 6.3% of Min-
nesotans are members of racial minorities, 49 although the state had
the fourth highest rate of minority population growth in the nation
during the 1980s.50 African-Americans are Minnesota's largest minor-
ity group5' and are heavily concentrated in the Twin Cities of Minne-
apolis and St. Paul, whose total minority population nearly doubled
between 1980 and 1990.52
The growing concentration of minority children in urban settings
and the disproportional involvement of minority youths in crime-
especially violent crime-sustain public and political perceptions of a
threatening structural "underclass."53 Professors Robert Sampson and
John Laub contend that structural inequality affects official social con-
trol.54 They argue that in settings marked by racial inequality, public
and political leaders will use the juvenile justice system to increase the
social control of members of the underclass.55 These demographic
49 MINNESOTA STATE DEMOGRAPHER, POPULATION NOTES 1 (1991) (6.3% compared with
24.4% of the United States, giving it the seventh smallest minority population in the
nation).
50 Id. at 3. The minority population in Minnesota grew 71.7% compared to the non
Hispanic white population, which rose only 4.7%, about the same as the national average
(4.4%).
51 Id. at 7. The 1990 census counted 94,944 African-American Minnesotans. While Af-
rican Americans are Minnesota's largest minority group, they constitute only 2.2% of the
population, well below the national average of 12.1%. Id. As a result of natural increase
and net migration, the African-American population increased 78% during the decade of
the 1980s. Id. at 6.
52 Id. at 7. Seventy-two percent of African-Americans reside in Minneapolis or St. Paul,
and an additional 23% are in the Twin Cities' suburbs. Only 6% are outside the seven
county metropolitan area and most of that group live in either Duluth or Rochester. Id.
The Twin Cities' minority population increased from 12.5% to 21.3%. Id.; see also MARCY R.
PODKOPACZ, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE BUREAU OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS (1993).
53 Professor Alfred Blumstein recently cautioned:
[T]here are many factors currently in place that should make the crime problem be-
come increasingly serious over the coming decade.... The effect of the changing
demographic composition will increase crime rates as the population in the 15-19 age
range (the one with the highest age-specific offending rates) will be growing over at
least the next decade, especially in the [racial] groups with the highest offending
rates.
Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant-The American Society of Ciminology 1992 Presi-
dential Address, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12 (1993); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993);
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987); THE URBAN UNDERCLASS (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1991).
54 See RobertJ. Sampson &John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court Processing-
Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Contro4 27 LAw & SoC'v REV. 285 (1993).
55 See id. at 293. In an earlier article, Professor Feld analyzed a number of the structural
features-racial composition, poverty, female-headed household, and the like-that Samp-
son and Laub hypothesized would affect juvenile justice administration. See Barry C. Feld,
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changes, and projections of more poor and minority urban youths in
the decade to come, provided the impetus for recent changes in Min-
nesota's juvenile waiver and criminal sentencing policies.56
The next section of this Article analyzes judicial waiver practices
between 1986 and 1992, when the prima facie case or rebuttable pre-
sumption law prevailed. It provides a comprehensive assessment of
judicial discretion in operation in an urban context.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF JUDICIAL WAIVER PRACTIcEs
Minnesota's judicial transfer law and process is typical of the
waiver strategy used by a majority of other states. Accordingly, the
information we collected and analyzed may generalize to the many
other jurisdictions that make similar judicial transfer decisions. Vari-
ous methodological short-comings limit the usefulness of past studies,
such as small samples, limited access to critical variables, a reduced
view of the offense both in terms of the present offense (including
only violent felonies for instance) and in the prior record of offenses.
This analysis focuses on the single most populous county in Minne-
sota, Hennepin County,57 which is composed of Minneapolis and its
surrounding suburbs, and mirrors many other major metropolitan ur-
ban areas. Hennepin County accounts for over a quarter of the state's
population and over a third of the FBI Part I crime. Over 42% of Part
I Violent Crime for the state occurs in Hennepin County, and
juveniles accounted for nearly a quarter of all clearances for these vio-
lent crimes.58
For this study, we pre-tested an extensive data collection protocol
and then gathered data from Juvenile Court files. 59 Court psycholo-
gists conducted a psychological examination and wrote a full report
for about half of the juveniles against whom the prosecutors filed a
reference motion. The Juvenile Probation department completed an
in-depth reference study on almost all of those juveniles evaluated by
Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations inJuvenilejustice Administration, 82
J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 166-69 (1991).
56 Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 16, at 982.
57 Our analyses are based largely on a study initiated and conducted in Hennepin
County in 1993-1994. See MARCY R. PODKOPACZ, JUVENILE REFERENCE STUDY, HENNEPIN
CoUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNIT CORRECTIONS (1994).
58 HENNEPIN COUNTY OFFICE OF PLANNING AND DEv., HENNEPIN CoumN CRIME REPORT
(1993).
59 We trained five employees loaned from the Departments of Community Corrections,
County Attorney's Office, and Juvenile Court to collect the data used in this study. Data
collection averaged about three and one-half hours per court file, with the range being
between half an hour and six hours. A copy of the coding form used to collect the data is
available from the authors upon request.
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Psychological Services. The Juvenile Court files contained the psycho-
logical report and the reference study, as well as information on delin-
quency charges, adjudications, dispositions, and social history reports.
In addition, we reviewed all disposition reports, probation progress
reviews, program progress reviews, and program exit summaries for
any other information to supplement the primary sources; these vari-
ous reports provided rich sources of information for this study. We
also interviewed the various participants in the waiver process and ob-
served court proceedings and pre-hearing conferences.
Although prima facie case statutory definitions attempt to guide
prosecutors' selection of which juveniles to file motions against for
adult reference, prosecutors are neither expected to charge all youths
whose delinquency background fits the criteria, nor precluded from
charging other youths who do not meet the criteria. Thus, the prose-
cutors' initial discretion necessarily defines the population of youth
included in this study and determines their characteristics. Our sam-
ple includes all juveniles against whom the prosecutors filed a refer-
ence motion for the first time between 1986 and 1992.60
As Table 1 shows, during the period of our study, white juveniles
comprised 81% of the ten to seventeen year old youth population in
Hennepin County.6' African-American adolescents comprised 9%
and other minority adolescents an additional 10% of the county's
60 Juveniles can be motioned for certification more than once if additional serious of-
fenses are charged while they are chronologically still juveniles. This study carefully
designed data collection on the first reference motion filed. Any subsequent motions are
captured in the recidivism sections. The determinants and likelihood of being transferred
to adult court are different for subsequent reference motions. See PODKOPACZ, supra note
57.
One possible criticism of this study, as in much of social science research, is that it may
suffer from population selection bias; when observations are selected in a manner that is
not independent of the outcome variable, in this case certification, selection bias is pres-
ent. The county attorney decides which offenders to file motions against for reference for
adult prosecution, and their decisions introduce selection bias. Because we lack informa-
tion about the other youths against whom the prosecutor did not file reference motions,
we cannot determine what factors influenced their charging decision. We do not know,
for example, how juveniles against whom prosecutors did not file reference motions differ
from those against whom they did file, or whether or how many of them the juvenile court
would have certified if the prosecutors had filed reference motions. In a preliminary exam-
ination, for example, we found that in 1992 alone the prosecutors charged over 300
juveniles with presumptive offenses, yet filed reference motions against less than 10% of
those offenders. See, e.g., Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 8, at 40 (comparing
certified juveniles with all delinquents and concluding that "no single factor or group of
factors explains why or how certified juveniles are selected from the larger universe of
juveniles"). Our future research will attempt to identify and model processes of selection
bias. We will attempt to ascertain what, if any, legal or social characteristics distinguish
these two groups of serious young offenders.
61 Census information provided courtesy of Hennepin County Office of Planning and
Development per a special request by the authors in 1994.
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Table 1
POPULATION AND SAMPLE STATISTICS BY RACIAL BACKGROUND
AFRICAN OTHER
WHITES AMERICANS MINORITIES
HENNEPIN COUN-IYJUVENILE POPULATION STATISrICS 81% 9% 10%
HENNEPIN COUNYJUVENIIE ARRESr STATisTICS*
Part I Index Crime 55% 32% 12%
Part I Violent Crime 84% 54% 13%
Part I Property Crime 57% 31% 13%
HENNEPIN COUNTY REFERENCE MOTIONS
All Motioned Juveniles 28% 55% 17%
(N=330)
PRESENT OFFENSE
Motioned for Person Crime 19% 65% 16%
(N=209)
Motioned for Property Crime 50% 28% 28%
(N=82)
AFRICAN OTHER
WHITES AMERICANS MINORITIES
MOTIONED JUVENIIE'S PRIOR DELrNQUENCY RECORD N=93 N=182 N=55
Percent with:
Any Felony Adjudications 67% 68% 71%
Property Felony Adjudications 50% 27% 40%
Person Felony Adjudications 15% 34% 31%
Presumptive Adjudications 7% 20% 11%
Average Number ofi
Felony Adjudications 1.97 1.52 2.04
Prior Out-of-Home Placements 3.17 2.48 3.37
REFERRAL RATE TO ADULT COURT 71% 63% 64%
* Race information was unavailable for a large part of the Hennepin County area for 1992 arrest
statistics. Therefore, all arrest statistics are based on an average of 1991 and 1993 and then
averaged with rates for 1986.
youth. However, police apprehension of juveniles in Hennepin
County for FBI Part I Index offenses62 reveals a different pattern. Po-
lice arrested white youths for 55% of all serious crimes, African-Ameri-
can youths for 32%, and other minority youths for the remaining
12%. This disproportionality between population percentages and
arrest percentages is striking and becomes even greater when viewing
62 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFoRM CRIME REPORTS
FOR THE UNITED STATES 1993 (1994). Local law enforcement agencies transmit data to
state agencies and the FBI based on reports from victims of crimes or investigation. Id. at
1-3. The FBI's Serious Crime Index includes both violent and property crimes and pro-
vides the most widely cited measure of offenses. Id. at 1. The Crime Index records four
violent crimes: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and ag-
gravated assault. Id. It also reports four property crimes: burglary, larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and arson. Id. Typically, both reported crimes and arrests are standardized
as rates per 100,000 persons to control for changes in population composition.
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the percentages of youths motioned for adult reference. Of those
youths against whom prosecutors filed transfer motions, 28% were
white, 55% were African-American, and 17% were of some other mi-
nority group.
Additionally, there are differences in the type of offense common
to the various racial groups. Police cleared most of the property
crimes with arrests of white juveniles (57%), and cleared most of the
violent crimes with arrests of African-American juveniles (54%), indi-
cating that race-crime specificity is evident at very early stages of the
juvenile justice process.63 When we analyze the racial characteristics
of youths against whom the prosecutors filed reference motions, the
race-offense nexus emerges even more graphically. Although about
one-third (34%) of the arrests for violent crimes involved white
juveniles, less than one-fifth (19%) of the violent offenders against
whom prosecutors filed reference motions were white. While African-
American youth account for a majority (54%) of all juvenile arrests for
violent crimes, they made up nearly two-thirds (65%) of the popula-
tion against whom prosecutors filed reference motions for felonies
against the person. The percentage of arrests and motions for serious
property crimes are similar.
These differences reflect both the prosecutors' decision to file
reference motions predominantly for violent crimes, as well as a differ-
ent and larger proportion of violent offenses in African-American
juveniles' prior records. Table 1 reports the prior delinquency record
for juveniles included in our study. Although the three racial groups
appear very similar in terms of the proportion that had any type of
past felony adjudication and the average number of past felony adju-
dications or out-of-home delinquency placements, they do differ in
their likelihood of having a prior person felony. Twice as many mi-
nority youths as white youths (34%, 31% vs. 15%) had an adjudication
for a felony against a person (p=.004), whereas whites were twice as
likely as African-Americans (50% vs. 27%) to have a delinquency his-
tory of property felonies (p<.001). Juveniles other than whites or Afri-
can-Americans had a less crime-specific delinquency background than
either of the latter groups; they were as likely as African-Americans to
have a history of person felonies and nearly as likely as whites to have
a background of property felonies.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines used to sentence adult of-
fenders presume that defendants convicted of certain violent crimes,
for example, murder, criminal sexual conduct, or felonies using a fire-
63 FBI, UCR 1991, supra note 44, at 279.
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arm, should be committed to prison.64 We ascertained whether the
juveniles against whom prosecutors filed reference motions were
charged with presumptive commitment to prison offenses or had
these types of offenses in their prior delinquency records. Using this
criteria, prosecutors filed reference motions for presumptive offenses
against 66% of the African-American juveniles, 18% of other minority
juveniles, and 16% of white juveniles. While only 15% of all the
juveniles had a prior adjudication for a presumptive commitment of-
fense, African-American youths constituted three-quarters of that
group. Twenty percent of all African American juveniles had pre-
sumptive commitment offenses in their delinquency history compared
with 11% of other minority juveniles and 7% of white juveniles. This
is a significant difference in past adjudications for presumptive of-
fenses by racial groups (p=.009).
Table 1 also reports information on the average number of prior
delinquency out-of-home placements for each racial group. Children
classified as other minorities had the highest average of prior delin-
quency placements and differed significantly only from the average
for African-Americans (p=.04). White youths were placed out of their
home for delinquency related matters nearly as often as other minor-
ity youths. The average number of out-of-home placements is larger
than the average number of felony adjudications, indicating that
youths may be placed out of the home for misdemeanor level adjudi-
cations as well.
Although the racial groups differ qualitatively in terms of the type
of present offenses charged and prior delinquency records (person
offenses for African-Americans and property offenses for whites), they
appear very similar in terms of the quantity of their prior delinquency
involvement (average number of prior felonies, percent of each group
that had any prior felonies, and the average number of prior juvenile
court placements). Finally, Table 1 shows 71% of white juveniles
against whom prosecutors filed a motion for referral to adult court
were certified, compared with 63% of African-American and 64% of
other minority juveniles. The racial difference in referral rates was
not statistically significant. Possibly, this indicates a ceiling of total fel-
ony level offenses acceptable within juvenile court, regardless of the
specific type of felonies.
Prosecutors typically filed a reference motion against a youth for
a single delinquent incident, although they may allege more than one
offense. In the typical case, the juvenile appears in court on the refer-
64 MIN. STAT. § 244 App. Minn. Sentencing Guidelines V (1992) (Offense Severity Ref-
erence Table).
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Table 2
CHANGES ACROSS TIME IN OFFENSE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
AND IN COURT PROCESS VARIABLES
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
NUMBER OF FIRST MOTIONS FILED
Percent Retained
Percent Referred to Adult Court
PRESENT OFFENSE
Percent Prima Facie Cases
Percent Presumptive Offense
Percent Person Felony
Percent Property Felony
Percent Using a Weapon
PAST ADJUDICATION HISTORY
Average Number of Felonies
Percent One Felony or Less
Percent Two or More Felonies
COMBINED PRESENT OFFENSE
SEVERITY AND ADJUDICATION
HISTORY*
Non-presumptive-Large history
Presumptive-Little history
PRIOR OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENTS
Average Number of Placements
Percent No prior placements
RACIAL BACKGROUND
Percent White
Percent African American
Percent Other Minority
AGE OF MOTIONED JUVENILE
Percent 14 or 15 years old
Percent 17 years old
PROBATION STUDIES
Percent Completed
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
Percent Completed
JUDGE PRESIDING**
53 41 61 46 54
30% 22% 43% 30% 28%
70% 78% 57% 70% 72%
2% 0 3% 24% 37%
53% 51% 51% 41% 54%
66% 61% 54% 54% 57%
28% 32% 33% 28% 26%
49% 34% 48% 41% 48%
2.11 2.51 1.59 1.46 1.65
40% 32% 57% 59% 57%
60% 68% 43% 41% 43%
40% 34% 26% 33% 28%
32% 17% 34% 33% 39%
3.49 3.20 2.10 2.07 1.93
15% 22% 34% 41% 39%
36% 44% 31% 33% 19%
59% 34% 44% 46% 65%
6% 22% 25% 22% 17%
8% 10% 13% 4% 13%
58% 58% 66% 61% 63%
40% 44% 41% 35% 43%
43% 44% 41% 37% 46%
* A large delinquency history is defined as having 2 or more felony adjudications prior to the
filing of the reference motion whereas little delinquency history is defined as 1 felony
adjudication or less (misdemeanors only or no prior ajudications).
** There were various other judges who heard reference hearings throughout the seven year
period, but none of them presided over Juvenile Court during these years and the number of
cases they heard individually were small.
ence motion on the present offenses with no other unresolved out-
standing offenses; 85% of the cases fit this pattern. For the remaining
15% of the youths, prosecutors simultaneously filed multiple refer-
ence motions for crimes arising out of several different behavioral in-
cidents, or they filed a single motion with other outstanding charges
pending. 65
65 Because of these atypical situations, we defined the present offense to include all
offenses that had the following- 1) identical adjudication dates as the offense listed on the
reference motion (the delinquency decisions occurred together); or 2) all reference mo-
tion decisions occurring on the same date as the first reference motion decision (separate
reference motions handled together at the same time). This definition allowed us to cap-
ture the full account of decisions that, for 15% of the cases, often were pled down to
40 35 330
55% 37% 35%
45% 63% 65%
50% 51% 43%
63% 57% 46%
#1 #1 #1 #1 #1-2-3 #2-3-4 #2-3-4
THE ENAD OF THE LINE
A. RATE OF TRANSFER
Table 2 displays a series of variables about the offense, the of-
fender, and the transfer process across the seven years of the study.
The first row is the number of first motions across each year, and the
third row reports the percentage of youths whom juvenile court
judges referred to adult criminal court over the seven year period.
The juvenile court handled an average of forty-seven reference mo-
tions per year, and waived about two-thirds (65%) of these youths for
adult prosecution. Except for 1988, when prosecutors filed a larger
number of reference motions, the certification rate from 1986
through 1990 was relatively stable and above 70%. The transfer rate
was somewhat lower in 1991 and 1992.
Two factors account for the change in certification rates in the
later years. First, the judge who presided from 1986 until 1990 left the
juvenile court bench. In the remaining two years, three other judges
heard most of the reference motions. Second, the County Attorney's
Office changed its reference motion filing policy in 1991 to concen-
trate primarily on youths who met the prima facie offense criteria.66
B. OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS
1. Present Offense
in 1991 and 1992, the County Attorney's Office filed more refer-
ence motions against youths who met the prima facie case criteria,
emphasizing the seriousness of the present offense rather than the
cumulative record of persistence. As a result, the percentage of cases
that met the serious offense criteria increased from less than 3% in
1986-1988 to about half of the cases in 1991-1992.
Reflecting this policy change, prosecutors charged significantly
more youths with presumptive commitment offenses (p=.02). Be-
tween 1986 and 1990, prosecutors filed reference motions against
about half of the juveniles for presumptive commitment offenses;
while by 1991 and 1992, they charged nearly three-quarters of all
juveniles (73% and 74%, respectively) with presumptive commitment
offenses. 67
offenses not listed on the first reference motion filed with the court.
66 Interview with Dianne Ward, Assistant Count Attorney, Chief ofjuvenile Prosecution
Division, County Attorney's Head ofJuvenile Prosecution (1993).
67 While they charged nearly a quarter of these juveniles (22%) with only one presump-
tive commitment offense, the remaining 33% faced two or more presumptive commitment
to prison offenses (the number of allegations ranged from one to 31 charges). Again, this
change reflects the County Attorney's policy decision to focus reference motions on
juveniles who met the primafacie case criteria and explains the corresponding decrease in
the total number of reference motions filed in later years.
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Prosecutors filed reference motions most often for felonies
against the person (63%). The proportion of reference motions filed
for violent crimes increased from about 60% in the earlier years to
about 80% by the end of our study. Prosecutors filed reference mo-
tions against 25% to 30% of the youths for property felonies in the
earlier years, but these charges declined significantly by 1991 and
1992 (p=.005) to only about 10% of the reference motions filed.68
Although about one-third (31.2%) of the reference motions alleged
only a single felony, prosecutors filed multiple counts against most of
the youths in this sample and charged over one quarter (26.4%) of
the juveniles with four or more felonies.
2. Weapons
Prosecutors filed most reference motions for violent crimes; the
juveniles used some type of weapon in about half (48.2%) of these
offenses.69 This percentage remained relatively constant across the
study years until the final year of 1992 when the percent of juveniles
who used weapons increased to nearly 70%. Our multivariate analyses
indicate that ajuvenile's use of a weapon significantly influenced the
court's decision to refer to adult court.
C. OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
1. Prior Delinquency Adjudications
We used three different indicators ofjuveniles' past delinquency
records. First, to measure seriousness, we detennined whether the
prior record included a presumptive commitment offense. Second, to
measure persistence, we simply counted the number of prior misde-
meanor or felony adjudications and weighted all felonies equally.
Third, we distinguished prior offenses by the type of crime, such as
felony offenses against the person, property, or drugs. We classified
juveniles' prior record on the basis of the most serious crime70 and
used these alternative constructions of prior records to test whether
68 Prosecutors charged nearly all the youths against whom they filed reference motions
with felony level offenses, although prior to 1991, they charged a few (2.7%) only with
misdemeanor offenses.
69 Juveniles' first choice of weapon was firearms (46%), followed by knives (22%),
blunt instruments (15%), or some other type of weapon such as a chain (17%). Juveniles
used their weapons to threaten 17% of their victims, to injure 21% of their victims, and to
kill 11% of their victims.
70 For example, we classify ajuvenile with one felony adjudication and multiple misde-
meanor adjudications in the "one felony" group. While we categorize offenses into groups
in the descriptive section to aid in the display of this information, in the multivariate analy-
ses, we use the actual number of offenses (interval level data), or other methods, such as
dummy coding, as appropriate.
468 [Vol. 86
THE END OF THE L7NE
the court considered the "quality" of the delinquency history or simply
the "quantity" in making reference decisions.
There is a straight forward trade-off between charging policies
emphasizing seriousness and persistence; the seriousness of the pres-
ent offenses and the length of the prior record are inversely related.
As prosecutors' reference motion policy emphasized the seriousness
of the present offense rather than cumulative persistence, the number
of prior felony adjudications in the juveniles' delinquency records de-
creased significantly over time, from 2.11 prior felonies in 1986 to
1.57 in 1992 (p=.005).
Mostjuveniles did not have prior adjudications for violent crimes,
and this did not change over the course of the study. Only about 15%
of all the motioned juveniles had prior adjudications for presumptive
offenses. However, the proportion ofjuveniles with prior property fel-
ony adjudications significantly decreased (p=.002), and the number of
juveniles with prior drug felony convictions increased between 1986
and 1992.
Interviews with the prosecutors, judges, and court service person-
nel indicated that prosecutors filed reference motions against two
"types" of juveniles. One group consisted of "persistent" offenders:
juveniles with an extensive prior delinquency history, mainly property
offenses, who were motioned on another property offense that simply
constituted the "last straw." These chronic offenders had exhausted
the juvenile treatment programs and resources. The other group con-
sisted of "serious" offenders: juveniles with a limited prior delinquency
history who were motioned on a presumptive commitment violent
crime. The combined present offense and adjudication history data
in Table 2 reflect this bi-modal distribution. These two categories
combined comprise over two-thirds of the motioned juveniles. In the
earlier years of the study, prosecutors filed reference motions mainly
against non-presumptive offenders with two or more prior delin-
quency adjudications, but by the end of the study, this flipped and
prosecutors charged over half of the juveniles, who had a limited (one
prior felony or less) delinquency history, with presumptive offenses.
This trend is reflected in the average number of prior out-of-
home placements across the study years as well. The persistent of-
fender of the earlier years averaged nearly three and one-half delin-
quency placements prior to the filing of the reference motion. In
1991, the average had dropped to only about one and one-half prior
placements before the prosecutor filed the reference motion, and the
overall decrease in the number of past program placements was signif-
icant (p<.001). Conversely, the percent of motioned juveniles with no
prior placements increased from only 15% in 1986 to 48% and 40% in
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1991 and 1992, respectively.
2. Racial Background
The County Attorney's policy change to emphasize the serious-
ness of the present offense affected the proportion of minority
juveniles over the period of our study because of the greater propen-
sity of minority youths to be arrested for and charged with the most
serious, violent crimes. Even in 1986, minority juveniles comprised
nearly two-thirds (64%) of the youths against whom prosecutors filed
reference motions; by the end of our study period, minority juveniles
comprised nearly nine out of ten (88%) of the youths whom prosecu-
tors sought to waive.
3. Age of Motioned Juveniles
The juvenile's age at the time of the present offense is an impor-
tant variable in the waiver process, because it indicates the length of
time remaining to treat the youth in the juvenile system. The mini-
mum age to file a reference motion is fourteen years old; at the time
we conducted this research, the juvenile court's maximum disposi-
tionaljurisdiction extended until age nineteen. 71 Prosecutors in Hen-
nepin County filed very few reference motions against juveniles
younger than sixteen years of age. Indeed, in the seven year span of
our study, prosecutors filed reference motions against only thirty-four
juveniles (10%) for crimes they committed when less than sixteen
years of age; twenty-four of those youths were fifteen years old and
only ten were fourteen years old. The vast majority ofjuveniles (296
youths or 90%) against whom prosecutors filed a referenc6 motion
were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the present offense;
fully 60% ofjuveniles were seventeen years old.
D. COURT PROCESS VARIABLES
Despite the number of studies that analyze waiver outcomes, sur-
prisingly few examine the process by which courts reach those deci-
sions.72 We examined the impact of the presiding juvenile court
judge and the effects of clinical and psychological evaluations on the
most important sentencing decision of juvenile courts.
71 MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1992). The Minnesota legislature subsequently extendedju-
venile court jurisdiction until age 21 for a category of serious young offenders whom the
juvenile court did not certify. MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1995). See Feld, Volent Youth and
Public Polic, supra note 16, at 1038-51 (analyzing extended jurisdiction juvenile
legislation).
72 SeeJeffrey Fagan et al., System Processing of VwlentJuvenile Offenders: An Empirical Assess-
ment, in VIOLENTJuvENILE OFFENDERS: AN ANTHOLOGY (Robert Mathias et al. eds., 1984).
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1. Court Service Evaluations and Studies
At the request ofjuvenile court, either the Juvenile Probation or
the Psychological Services divisions of the Department of Community
Corrections evaluates the personal or psychological characteristics of
the offender, family background, education, and delinquency back-
ground of youths against whom the prosecutor files a reference
motion.
The Juvenile Probation department may provide a detailed social
report, called a reference study.73 The juvenile court requested refer-
ence studies in only 43% of the cases, although the number of refer-
ence study requests increased to about 50% in the final two years of
our study, when more youths faced charges for violent crime. A re-
quest for a reference study did not significantly affect the outcome of
waiver decisions. The court retained jurisdiction over 34% of those
juveniles for whom it requested reference studies and over 37% of
those juveniles for whom it did not request a study. Probation officers
collected and summarized the available social, behavioral, and clinical
information about the youths and recommended retention or transfer
to the juvenile court. Probation officers' recommendations statisti-
cally influence juvenile court decisions (p<.0001).74 These consistent
relationships may reflect either heavy judicial reliance on probation
staffs recommendations, or the probation staffs familiarity with and
anticipation of judicial waiver and practices. 75
The juvenile court ordered psychological evaluations for nearly
all of the youths for whom it requested reference studies, and for a
few additional youths as well. Overall, the courts requested psycholog-
ical evaluations of 46% of the juveniles with some increases in the
latter years of our study (63% in 1991 and 57% in 1992).76
Psychological Services staff members were occasionally uncertain
whether the court expected them to make a definitive recommenda-
tion of referral or retention, and in thirty-four of the 153 psychologi-
73 For a comprehensive description of the types of clinical information available to Min-
nesota juvenile court judges in reference hearings, see Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases,
supra note 8, at 54-69.
74 The court retained jurisdiction in 87% of the cases in which the probation officer
recommended that the juvenile be retained, and waivedjurisdiction in 94% of the cases in
which the probation officer recommended that the court refer the juvenile to adult court.
75 See, e.g., Robert M. Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Cour, in HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 647 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974) (discussing clinical anticipation of courts'
likely disposition and organizational pressures to "conform to prevailing court standards of
what is reasonable and to eschew risk-taking"); DAVID MATZA, DEINQUENCY AND DIFr
(1964).
76 Whether or not the court requested a psychological evaluation did not significantly
affect the reference decision. Juvenile courts retained jurisdiction over 37% of the youth
who were examined by a court psychologist and 33% of those who did not see a clinician.
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cal examinations (22%), no specific recommendation appeared. In
those cases in which psychologists made clear-cut recommendations,
the court retained jurisdiction in 80% of the cases in which psycholo-
gists recommended retaining a youth in juvenile court and waived ju-
risdiction in 94% of the cases in which the psychologist recommended
a youth's transfer to criminal court (p<.001).
Psychological Services staff agreed with probation officers 63% of
the time when recommending transfer to criminal court and 77% of
the time when recommending that the juvenile court retain jurisdic-
tion over a youth. Almost all of the instances of nonagreement oc-
curred when probation staff made a recommendation and the
psychologists declined to make a recommendation.
2. Juvenile Court Judge
One judge presided over the juvenile court for about half of the
period covered by our study and several other judges served for
shorter tenures. 77 The four judges in Table 2 heard 85% of all the
first reference motions filed (Table 2 shows the years of their tenure).
Judge #1 handled over half of all the reference cases in our study
(55%) and referred about three quarters (75%) of the youths against
whom prosecutors filed a reference motion. By contrast, Judge #4 re-
ferred only about half (54%) of the cases he decided. Thus, the pre-
siding judge's judicial and administrative philosophy may be an
important variable affecting the reference process.
The variability of waiver rates requires further explanation.
There is no standard waiver rate, and research in other jurisdictions
indicates substantial variation. 78 The seriousness of youth crime,
County Attorney charging policies, defense attorney plea negotiation
strategies, and juvenile placement options all affect transfer rates. In
our study, for example, prosecutors filed reference motions alleging
presumptive commitment to prison offenses against only 46% of the
juveniles whose cases Judge #1 decided, compared with 74% of those
Judge #2 decided, 69% thatJudge #3 heard, and 77% of those before
Judge #4. Juveniles charged with presumptive commitment offenses
are often younger offenders who have less extensive prior records and
fewer treatment placements; consequently, the decision whether to
waive them to criminal court may be more difficult.
The philosophy and policies of the presiding judge also affect re-
77 Hennepin County judges now serve a three year rotating schedule in juvenile court
that allows each judge to handle approximately 35 to 50 reference motions.
78 See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 7, at 112 (transfer rates in other cities ranges from 21%
(Boston), 31% (Detroit), 41% (Newark) and 71% (Phoenix)).
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ferral rates. For example, after controlling for the seriousness of the
reference motion offense, Judge #1 referred 76% of those youths
charged with presumptive commitment to prison offenses, while
Judge #2 referred 64% of the youths charged with presumptive of-
fenses, Judge #3 referred 79%, and Judge #4 waived 55%. The
juveniles in the latter years also had less extensive prior delinquency
records. Moreover, the waiver decision is only part of the overall sen-
tencing process. In many instances, after the juvenile court judge re-
fers a youth for adult criminal prosecution, he or she will preside as a
criminal court judge over the adult component of the case. Because
the waiver decision often is part of a plea-bargained "package deal,"
reference decisions cannot be viewed in isolation from the subsequent
sentences of a youth as a juvenile or as an adult.79
Table 3 shows each of the six independent variables found to be
significant in our multivariate analysis. We defined these six indica-
tors as part of the court process, attributes of the offender, or charac-
teristics of the offense. This Table examines each of the three
categories of variables individually. These bivariate analyses report
the percentage ofjuveniles that were referred to criminal court within
the various combination of characteristics.
The first part of the Table shows the court process variables; the
rows indicate which judge presided over the reference decision. Be-
cause Judge #1 presided over 55% of the reference decisions and re-
ferred juveniles at a higher rate than the other judges, we created a
dummy code for Judge #1. The columns describe the type of recom-
mendation made by the probation department and psychological
services.
These professionals evaluated about half of the juveniles against
whom prosecutors filed reference motions and recommended
whether the court should refer or retain them. A request for a clinical
evaluation was not a defacto waiver decision; youths who received addi-
tional clinical services are neither more nor less likely to be certified
because they are evaluated.80
79 For example, althoughJudge #1 certified a larger proportion (75%) ofjuveniles and
more chronic property offenders, when he sentenced these youths as adults, he committed
78% to a county jail (where the sentence is one year or less) and sentenced only 16% to
prison. By contrast, Judges #3 and #4 initially referred a lower proportion of youths to
criminal court (61% and 54% respectively), but sentenced a much larger proportion of
those they certified to prison (50% and 64% respectively), rather than to shorter term jail
sentences (38% and 29%).
80 However, the juveniles for whom the courts ordered reference studies or psychologi-
cal evaluations differed from those who did not receive these services in other ways. For
example, courts requested these evaluations more often for younger juveniles with less
extensive prior records whom the prosecutors charged with violent crimes against the
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Table 3
THE CERTIFICATION RATE OF MOTIONED JUVENILES
(Percent of juveniles in each cell transferred to adult court)
1. The Effect of COURT PROCESS Variables
What are the Probation/Psychologist Recommendations?
No
Both Juvenile Recommendation* Both Adult TOTAL
Who is the Judge? N=54 N=189 N=87 N=330
Judge #1 8% 80% 100% 75%
N=179
OtherJudges 14% 40% 93% 50%
N=151
TOTAL 11% 63% 97% 65%
2. The Effect of OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
Number of Prior Out-of-Home Delinquency Placements
None One to Three Four or More TOTAL
Age of Offender N=111 N=113 N=106 N=330
14 or 15 Years Old 31% 17% 17% 24%
N=34
16 Years Old 48% 47% 82% 61%
N=98
17 Years Old 62% 76% 85% 74%
N=198
TOTAL 54% 62% 80% 65%
3. The Effect of Present OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS
Type of Present Offense and Whether a Weapon was Used
Person-No Person-
Non-Person Weapon Weapon TOTAL
Number of Charges N=121 N=54 N=155 N=330
Two Felonies or Less 51% 55% 70% 59%
N=192
Three Charges or More 83% 68% 73% 74%
N=138
TOTAL 59% 61% 72% 65%
* The no recommendation category includes the eleven juveniles who were evaluated and the
probation officer and psychologist disagreed on the court recommendation. In the multivariate
model these eleven youth are kept as a unique category.
To detect agreement or disagreement between court services per-
sonnel, we combined their appraisals.81 We constructed the catego-
ries as follows: 1) both the probation officer and the psychologist
person.
81 Although probation and psychological services personnel conducted their assess-
ments separately, members of each department often shared information between them.
For example, if a probation officer reviewed possible treatment programs for the offender
and did not find any options available, he or she could communicate the information to
the psychologist. We could not determine how often or to what extent probation and
psychological personnel shared information, nor how much the shared information influ-
enced their respective recommendations.
THE END OF THE LINE
agreed that the juvenile should be referred to adult court; 2) both
court employees agreed the youth should remain in juvenile court; 3)
the probation officer and the psychologist disagreed on the reference
recommendation;8 2 and finally, 4) neither conducted an assessment.
Keeping the disagreement category separate from the other catego-
ries allows a more exact interpretation of each. In Table 3, the third
and fourth categories have been combined for display purposes. In
the multivariate analysis (see Table 4) they remained separate.
The first part of Table 3 indicates thatJudge #1 referred juveniles
at a much higher rate (75%) than the other judges as a group (50%
referral rate). This difference was even more striking when there
were no recommendations solicited from the probation department
or psychological services (Judge #1 referred 80% while other judges
referred 40%). In addition, when the court service personnel recom-
mended transfer, there was near certainty that a juvenile would be
referred to criminal court regardless of which judge presided. Like-
wise, when these court officers recommended retaining a juvenile,
very few judges opposed that decision. Clearly, including variables
that assess court processes in the analysis of the factors determining
certification are important.
The second section of Table 3 displays the age and prior place-
ment history of the offenders in this study. The court referred to
adult court only about one quarter of the younger motioned offend-
ers, 61% of the sixteen year old youths, and 74% of those who were
seventeen when they committed their present offense. There are sev-
eral possible explanations for the relationship between age and waiver
decisions. First, a youth's age may act as a proxy for prior delin-
quency: older juveniles have a longer opportunity to acquire a more
extensive prior record.83 Second, a youth's age determines the length
of time remaining for treatment within juvenile jurisdiction. Finally,
judges may view younger offenders as less culpable for their crimes
and decline to certify them as readily.
We analyzed a number of alternative measures of prior delin-
quency history. Because a youth's "amenability. to treatment" is a cru-
cial issue in the waiver decision, the extent of previous dispositions
may indicate ajuvenile's exhaustion of treatment resources and pro-
82 There were a few cases in which one assessor gave a recommendation and the other
did not provide a recommendation even though they completed an evaluation (five of the
probation studies and 34 of the psychological evaluations). In these cases, we assigned the
recommendation we had as an agreement category according to the one that was provided.
83 This could occur unless a measure of prior delinquency is also included. In our
multivariate analysis we controlled for prior delinquency in the form of prior out-of-home
placements.
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vide a rationale to transfer a youth to criminal court. We found that
prior program placement was the most robust indicator of prior juve-
nile court involvement. It was highly correlated with prior delin-
quency record (r = .7), and when we included both variables in the
model, we gained no additional information from prior delinquency
history. We included only prior program placements in our model as
the single indicator of past juvenile justice involvement, because it
provided a stronger predictor of the reference decision than prior
delinquency.
Juvenile court referred about half (54%) of those youths with no
prior delinquency placement history. This referral rate jumped to
80% for those youths with four or more prior delinquency place-
ments. The cells inside the Table indicate that sixteen year old
juveniles were transferred as frequently as seventeen year olds when
they both had four or more placements (82% and 85%, respectively).
Therefore, as important as age is in determining who is certified, at a
certain point, prior history with the juvenile court becomes as
important.
The final part of Table 3 reports information about the offense
most common to other certification studies. We analyzed both the
number of charges alleged in the reference motion and the type of
crime charged. The court referred three quarters (74%) of the
youths against whom prosecutors filed three or more charges, com-
pared with 59% of those juveniles charged with two or fewer felony
offenses. We first categorized the present offense into non-person
and person offenses and secondly considered whether or not a
weapon was used. The transfer rate for juveniles charged with a non-
person offense (59%) was very similar to the transfer rate for those
youths with a person offense who did not use a weapon (61%). The
rate increased to 72% for those youths charged with a person felony
who used a weapon.
The highest referral rate in the third section of Table 3 occurred
for youths who were charged with a non-person offense and who had
three or more charges against them on the present offense (83%).
These particular juveniles had significantly (p=.0001) more prior de-
linquency placements than either of the other two offense categories
(3.2 prior placements for those whose present offense was non-per-
son, 2.3 for person offense with no weapon, and 1.3 for person offense
with a weapon), which may explain the high certification rate.
E. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The multivariate technique used in this analysis was logistic re-
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gression. It is most appropriate when the dependent variable, refer-
ence decision, is a binary indicator (refer or retain). Multivariate
analyses assess the relative impact of each independent variable (the
present offense, judge presiding, number of prior delinquency place-
ments, age, and the like), while controlling for the effects of the other
independent variables. In addition, multivariate regression tech-
niques allow us to evaluate the combined strength and significance of
all the independent factors in explaining or predicting the dependent
variable.84 Table 4 provides the coefficients for the significant in-
dependent variables included in the logistic regression analyses of the
reference decision.
The interpretation of these coefficients can be described within
the framework of the odds of an event occurring. Unlike the normal
use of the term "odds" indicating probability, in this setting "odds"
indicates the ratio of the probability of an event occurring (ajuvenile
being referred to adult court) compared with the probability of the
event not occurring. A positive logistic coefficient indicates greater or
higher odds while a negative coefficient indicates reduced or lower
odds. For categorical variables, the coefficient is interpreted in rela-
tion to the excluded category.85 Using categorical variables in logistic
regression is appropriate for truly categorical variables, such as court
services recommendation, and for non-linear, continuous variables,
such as age. This allows us to determine if the variable as a whole is
significant, but also if and how each of the included categories differ
from the excluded category.
Table 4 compares two different models. Model 2 shows our data
using indicators most common to other waiver studies, that is, of-
fender and offense factors. Model 1 includes our two indicators of
court process in addition to the Model 2 variables. Various methods
exist to compare the two models: we can compare the percent cor-
rectly classified, we can compare the model chi-squares between the
two scenarios, and we can compare the actual coefficients for changes.
The next section provides a full discussion of Model 1, followed by a
discussion of these comparisons.
84 In the case of dichotomous variables, linear or ordinary least squares regression can
lead to incorrect analyses of the effects of the independent variables upon the dependent
variable. SeeJOHN H. ALDRICH & FoRRmsr D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILry, LOCIT, AND
PROBIT MODELS (1984).
85 In constructing our model, we attempted to maintain consistency in the excluded
categories of our independent variables. Because each coefficient represents a contrast
with the omitted category, this consistency allows for a clearer interpretation of the rela-
tionships in our model.
1996]
PODKOPA CZ & FELD
Table 4
LOGIT ESTIMATES
DETERMINANTS OF WAIVER TO ADULT COURT
[Vol. 86
Model 1 Model 2
Without Court
All Variables Process
Parameter B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Intercept
COURT PROCESS INDICATORS
COURT SERVICES RECOMMENDATIONS
Both Recommend Referral
Both Recommend Retention
Recommendations Disagree
(No recommendation - omitted)
JUVENILE COURTJUDGE PRESIDING
Judge #1
(OtherJudges - omitted)
OFFENDER INDICATORS
AGE AT PRESENT OFFENSE
14 years old
15 years old
16 years old
(17 years old - omitted)
PRIOR DELINQUENCY OuT-oF-HOME PLACEMENTS
No prior placements
1-3 prior placements
(4 or more prior placements - omitted)
OFFENSE INDICATORS
NUMBER OF PRESENT OFFENSE CHARGES
(2 Felony Charges or Less - omitted)
3 Felony Charges or More
TYPE OF PRESENT OFFENSE-WEAPON USE
(Non-Person Offense - omitted)
Person Offense-No Weapon
Person Offense-Weapon
Constant -2 Log Likelihood
Model -2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Degrees of freedom
Significance
TOTAL PERCENT CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED
Percent Correct for Referred Youths
Percent Correct for Retained Youths
.34 .40 1.44 .31
4.72 1.27 .0002
-2.67 .56 .0000
.79 1.02 .4363
1.43 .35 .0000
-4.07 1.63 .0126 -3.68
-4.71 1.26 .0002 -2.35
-. 79 .38 .0362 -. 87
1.09 .0008
.53 .0000
.30 .0033
-1.12 .44 .0103 -1.75 .36 .0000
-. 98 .46 .0308 -1.40 .36 .0001
.86 .38 .0228 .88 .29 .0026
.30 .49 .5390 .20 .38 .6009
1.03 .42 .0146 1.14 .32 .0004
Model 1
426.69
229.47
197.23
12
.0000
85.45%
92.56%
72.17%
Model 2
426.69
345.73
80.96
8
.0000
76.06%
89.77%
50.43%
F. SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES
1. Court Services Recommendations
One of the most powerful variables in our model was the recommen-
dation given by court services personnel. When the probation officer
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and psych6logist agreed on a recommendation either to retain juve-
nile courtjurisdiction or to refer the youth to adult court, there was a
statistically significant probability that the court would follow that ad-
vice. In particular, if both the probation officer and the court psychol-
ogist recommended that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, the
highly significant logistic coefficient (4.7) indicates that transfer wa a
near certainty. When both court personnel recommended that the
juvenile court retain jurisdiction over the youth, the odds of transfer
to criminal court decreased significantly (p < .0001). The negative
sign of the logistic coefficient (-2.7) indicates reduced odds that the
court would certify this group of youths compared with the no recom-
mendation group. Where coturt officials disagreed about a youth's dis-
position, they did not significantly affect the likelihood of
certification. 86
2. Juvenile Court Judge
Which juvenile court judge presided over the reference process
constituted another significant process variable. We saw from Table 3
thatJudge #1 referred juveniles at a higher rate than otherjudges who
presided in subsequent years. But that view could have resulted be-
cause Judge #1 made decisions under different conditions than the
other judges. Multivariate analysis allows us to test this proposition.
When we control for all the other factors in our model, Table 4 shows
that youths who appeared before Judge #1 had significantly higher
odds of being referred when compared to the other judges as a group
(1.4). This finding is consistent with our contention that judicial
waiver is a highly individualized, discretionary sentencing decision in
which the outcomes depend significantly upon who is the judge.
3. Age at Present Offense
A youth's age at the time the prosecutor filed the reference mo-
tion constituted a significantly powerful variable influencing refer-
ence decisions. The older the youth, the greater the likelihood that
the judge would refer the case to criminal court. This was not an en-
tirely linear relationship, however. Fourteen and fifteen year old
86 The outcomes in the disagreement category did not differ significantly from those
cases in which court services personnel did not evaluate a juvenile or make any
recommendation.
There were 11 cases where the court service personnel did not agree. Categories with
a small number of cases do not automatically produce insignificant effects. For example,
in our data, the variable of age at present offense included only ten 14 year old juveniles,
and yet produced a significant negative effect on certification when compared to 17 year
old youths. A small number of cases can produce significant effects if the strength of the
relationship is large.
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youths were much less likely to be certified than seventeen year old
youths (-4.07,-4.71).87 The logit coefficient for sixteen year old
youths, though not as strong as the younger ages (-.79), also reflected
reduced odds of being referred when compared to a seventeen year
old youth.
4. Prior Program Placements
We categorized prior out-of-home placements into three group-
ings: 1) no prior delinquency placements; 2) one to three prior place-
ments; and 3) four or more prior placements (the excluded category).
We found that both of the first two categories differed significantly
from the final category (logistic coefficients of -1.1 and -.98, respec-
tively). Youths with no prior placements and with only a few (one to
three) prior placements experienced significantly lower odds of being
certified to adult court than did those youths in the alternative cate-
gory of four or more program placements. Effectively, prior place-
ments did not become a significant factor in the certification decision
until a youth crossed a threshold of four or more placements.
5. Number of Present Offense Charges
We dichotomized the number of present charges alleged in the
reference motion into two or fewer felonies (the excluded category)
and three or more felonies. The number of felony charges that the
prosecutor alleged in the reference motion significantly affected
whether or not the court certified ajuvenile (.9); the odds of transfer
were greater when the prosecutor alleged three or more charges
against a youth. Multiple charges may provide an additional indicator
of the seriousness of the case pending against a youth.88
6. Present Offense Characteristics
We analyzed several different indicators of the seriousness of the
present offense and ultimately constructed three categories of offend-
ers alleged by prosecutors: 1) those who committed a felony offense
against the person and used a weapon; 2) those who committed a fel-
ony offense against the person but did not use a weapon; or 3) those
who committed a felony (e.g., property or drug) other than a crime
against the person.89 Recall that prosecutors charged nearly two-
87 This is particularly notable for the 14 year old juveniles since that category included
only ten youths.
88 See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of Wen
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1280-82
(1989) (multiple charges as indicator of greater seriousness of case).
89 Four youths possessed a weapon but were not charged with a crime against the per-
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thirds (63%) of the juveniles with some type of violent crime.
Whether the prosecutor charged a youth with a crime against the per-
son did not necessarily increase the likelihood of transfer. In an ur-
ban setting in which prosecutors file reference motions against most
juveniles for violent offenses and courts certify youths on the basis of
their cumulative delinquency records, the seriousness of the present
offense alone may be a secondary consideration. When we controlled
for the other variables, the juvenile court was no more likely to certify
youths charged with a felony offense against the person than to waive
those charged with property offenses, provided that the juvenile did
not use a weapon (.3). However, if the prosecutor alleged that the
youth committed a crime against the person and used a weapon in the
commission of the offense, then the court was significantly more likely
(1.0) to waive the youth to criminal court. Thus, a weapon appears to
be a necessary component of the seriousness of the offense.
7. Variables Not Found To Be Significant
Contrary to our expectations, several variables were not statisti-
cally significant in our multivariate analyses. In particular, whether
the reference motion charged a youth with a felony offense against
property did not significantly affect the outcome of the waiver process.
This finding differs from some previous studies that report that courts
certified most juveniles for property offenses.90
In view of the disproportionate over-representation of minority
youths against whom prosecutors filed reference motions, the fact that
we did not find a positive effect for race is an important finding.91
Our result is consistent with other multivariate analyses that reported
no racial bias toward minorities in waiver decisions. 92
G. PREDICTIVE STRENGTH OF THE STATISTICAL MODEL
Logistic regression can demonstrate the fit of the model in sev-
son. We coded them with the other non-person offenders.
90 See, e.g., HAMPARLAN Er AL., supra note 3; Bormer, supra note 25, at 59; Feld, supra
note 2, at 821 (summarizing empirical research on determinants of waiver).
91 Because this study used three racial categories, we dummy coded for African-Ameri-
cans and other minorities, and entered each into the equation using whites as the refer-
ence category. Although the race variable, in total, was not significant we did find that
African-Americans had significantly lower odds of being referred when compared to whites.
Other minority youths did not differ significantly from either whites or African-Americans.
In addition, adding the race indicator did not improve the explanatory power of the model
and, therefore, was not included.
92 See Tammy Meredith Poulos & Stan Orchowsky, Serious Juvenie Offenders: Predicting the
Probability of Transfer to Criminal Court, 40 CRimE & DELINQ. 3 (1994); see also Fagan et al.,
supra note 22.
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eral different ways. One method commonly used is comparing the
cases predicted by the model to be referred with those youths actually
referred and those cases predicted to be retained in juvenile court to
those actually retained. This provides us with a percentage of cor-
rectly classified cases. Our model correctly classified 85% of the cases
(more than eight out of ten youths).93 If we possessed no information
about individual youths, their backgrounds, or the juvenile court pro-
cess, we would expect random accuracy of 56%.94 By using the infor-
mation contained in our model, we can substantially improve the
accuracy of the prediction by 29%, or about ninety-six more juveniles.
Another method used to test the strength of the logistic model is
analyzing the model chi-square. This statistic tests the null hypothesis
that the coefficients for the variables in the model are zero. A compa-
rable statistic in linear multiple regression is the overall F statistic.
Model 1 has a model chi-square of 197.23 with twelve degrees of free-
dom, which is highly significant and allows us to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the logistic coefficients are zero.
Some analysts, more familiar with linear regression, assess the
amount of variance (R2) that the variables in the equation can ex-
plain. For logit regression, we can calculate a pseudo R2 that is a
proxy of explained variance.95 Generally, percentages representing
pseudo R2 are conservative measures in comparison to the R2 of multi-
ple regression. Model l's pseudo R2 is over 40%. This is a substantial
improvement over the 3% of explained variance reported in an ear-
lier analysis of reference decisions for all of Minnesota in 1986.96
93 The model does a better job of correctly predicting which youths the juvenile court
judge referred (93%) than it does predicting which will be retained in the juvenile system
(72%).
94 See Rolf Loeber & Thomas Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency: A Review, 94
PSYCHOL. BULL. 68 (1983).
IMPROVEMENT OVER CHANCE=ACTuAL AccuRAy-RANDOM ACCURACY
where,
RANDOM AccuRACY=(RCV (TRUE PoSrrIVES) + RCV (TRUE NEGATIVES)) X 100
WHERE,
RCV (RANDOM CORRECT VALUES) FOR TRUE POSITIVES=
(NUMBER OBSERVED TO BE REFERRED/TOTAL YOUTH) x
(NUMBER PREDICTED TO BE REFERRED/TOTAL YOUTH)
RCV (RANDOM CORRECTr VALUES FOR TRUE NEGATIVES=
(NUMBER OBSERVED TO BE RETAINED/TOTAL YOUTH) x
(NUMBER PREDICTED TO BE RETAINED/TOTAL YOUTH)
AND,
ACTUAL AcCURACY=-((Model true positives + Model true negatives)/Total youth) x
100).
95 See ALDRICH & NELSON, supra note 84; see also ALFRED DEmAIns, LoGIT MODELING:
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS (1992).
96 See Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 8, at 37-41. This study provided a one
year snapshot of reference decision-making for the entire state, but possessed fewer details
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H. COMPARISON TO MODEL 2
When we exclude the court process variables, the prior out-of-
home placements become more important indicators of how the
court made the decision to handle juveniles. When specialized social
history studies, including in-depth evaluations completed by psycholo-
gists, are not available, the court is forced to use the only other indica-
tor of past behavior and treatment-prior delinquency history in the
form of prior dispositions. Age becomes less significant in Model 2
than in Model 1, although it remains the variable with the largest coef-
ficients. There is relatively little change in the importance of the pres-
ent offense characteristics. Both models report similar odds of being
referred for youths charged with a non-person present offense and for
youths charged with a person present offense with no weapon; both
models indicate that a person offender who used a weapon has higher
odds of transfer. The model chi-square for Model 1 is over twice as
large as for Model 2 with only four additional degrees of freedom-a
good tradeoff. In addition the psuedo R2 for Model 1 is more than
twice as large as for Model 2 (19%).
The most interesting comparison is the change in the percentage
of correctly classified cases. Model 2 correctly predicts the outcomes
of 76% of the youths in our study, while Model 1 correctly classifies
over 85% of the youths (this percentage difference is equivalent to
about thirty juveniles). However, this increase in correctly classified
cases is composed of a nearly identical percentage to Model 1 for
juveniles referred (92.56% for Model 1 and 89.77% for Model 2) and
a substantial difference in the percentage of youths not referred that
Model 1 correctly predicts and Model 2 does not (72% for Model 1
and 50% for Model 2).
The evaluations and social histories of youths, reported by court
service personnel, provide the court with the individual information
necessary to retain a juvenile-information that may go beyond the
circumstances of the offense or delinquency background. 97 It seems
clear from the comparison of these two models that having family his-
tory and individualized social information allows us to predict more
about each waiver decision.
97 Our past work has indicated that very little "standardized" individual and family in-
formation is provided to juvenile court judges on motioned children. This lack of struc-
tured information does not mean that judges made reference decisions with little
individualized information. On the contrary, forjuveniles that had probation studies and
psychological evaluations, the court was afforded volumes of information about the partic-
ular youth's history, but across these juveniles, the information could not be standardized.
See Marcy 1- Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Serious-
ness and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ.J. 73 (1995).
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consistently which youths the juvenile court will retain. Most likely,
court service workers are able to articulate 'extenuating' or 'mitigat-
ing' circumstances not captured by the standard offense and offend-
ers variables commonly used in waiver studies.
Because some studies indicate that racial bias exists in the waiver
process and other studies suggest that it does not, we decided to test
our reduced model (Model 2) for a race effect. None existed. Recall
that our preferred model (Model 1) found an overall non-significant
effect for race, which did not contribute to the explanatory power of
the model. However, within this overall non-significant effect, one
comparison indicated significance: African-Americans had reduced
odds of being referred when compared to white motioned youth. We
were curious as to which of our court process variables contributed to
this counter-intuitive finding and found that the court service recom-
mendations were responsible for this interesting effect. That is, when
the probation/psychologist recommendations are added to Model 2,
the one difference appears between African-Americans and white
youths.
Recall that courts requested these in-depth studies and ultimate
recommendations more frequently for juveniles charged with serious
person offenses. Because prosecutors charged African-American
juveniles most often with violent crimes, they also received more
clinical evaluations. However, because our model controlled for the
present offense, this one race effect finding must be related to some
type of "extenuating circumstance" that exists for African-American
youths more frequently than white youths. Recall that Model 1 accu-
rately reflected the reference decision for thirty more youths than
Model 2 and most of these youths were ultimately retained in juvenile
court. Indeed, restricting our view to white and African-American re-
tained juveniles incorrectly identified by Model 2, 70% were African-
American and 30% were white youth. Providing the court with indi-
vidualized information about a youth-the circumstances surround-
ing his or her home life-seems to warrant enough exceptions to
their offense and delinquency history for retention in these cases. A
model that excludes this summary recommendation of the clinicians
would incorrectly predict a higher referral rate.
It is clear that Model 1, which includes the court process vari-
ables, does much better correctly predicting youths who were retained
and does slightly better predicting juveniles who were referred to
adult court. Future studies of juvenile transfer procedures should in-
clude these and possible other court process variables to continue to
learn the intricacies of the waiver process.
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I. POST-WAIVER JUVENILE OR CRIMINAL COURT SENTENCING OF YOUNG
OFFENDERS
Once juvenile court decides whether or not to transfer ajuvenile,
what happens to the case? We followed the justice system careers of
each youth to determine whether a conviction ensued in juvenile or
criminal court,98 what sentence was imposed, and the impact ofjuve-
nile or adult sentences on subsequent recidivism.
1. Dispositions and Sentences of Youth in Juvenile and Criminal Court
Juvenile courts transfer some youths to criminal court so that they
may receive longer sentences as adults than are available in the juve-
nile system. However, several studies report a "punishment gap" and
question whether criminal courts impose more severe sanctions on
waived youths than juvenile courts would if they retain jurisdiction. 99
Chronic property offenders who constitute the bulk of waived
juveniles in most states receive shorter sentences as adults than do
property offenders retained in juvenile court.'00 By contrast, youths
convicted of violent offenses in criminal courts receive substantially
longer sentences than do their juvenile counterparts.10 1 Forjuveniles
and adults convicted of comparable crimes, both types of disparities-
shorter sentences for waived youths than for retained juveniles adjudi-
cated of property offenses, and longer sentences for convicted waived
youths than for retained juveniles adjudicated of violent crimes-raise
issues of sentencing policy and justice. Are either types of disparities
justified? Are there any policy rationales for the disjunction?
We examined the types of sentences juvenile and criminal courts
imposed on retained and referred youths, the proportion of offenders
they incarcerated in correctional facilities, and, of those confined, the
98 The overall rate of dismissed or unproved cases at this point in the process is very low
at 6%. The courts dismissed charges against 14% of the youths retained in the juvenile
system, but only 3% of those referred to adult criminal court. Clearly, prosecutors exper-
ienced less difficulty establishing the guilt of those youths referred to criminal court. This
suggests either thatjuvenile courts implicitly may screen waiver cases for their prosecutive
merits, or that prosecutors may pursue less vigorously the juvenile cases in which they
anticipate less penal pay-off for their efforts. See also Fagan, supra note 7. (similar percent-
ages of dismissals for retained and referred juveniles).
99 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. See also PETER W. GREENWoOD ET AL.,
FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 12-14 (1984);
HAmPAMAN Er AL., supra note 3, at 106-09 (Majority ofjuveniles transferred to adult court
in 1978 subsequently received fines or probation, and among those confined, 25% re-
ceived maximum sentences of one year or less.).
100 See, e.g., Bormer, supra note 25; Gillespie & Norman, supra note 25.
101 See, e.g., Cary Rudman et al., Trolent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punihment 32
CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986); Marilyn Houghtalin & G. Larry Mays, Criminal Dispositions of
New Mexico Juveniles Transferred to Adult Court, 37 CRIME & DEUNQ. 393 (1991).
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Table 5
COMPARISON OF INCARCERATION CERTAINTY AND LENGTH FOR
REFERRED AND RETAINED JUVENILES BY SEVERITY OF OFFENSE
Referred to Criminal Court Retained in Juvenile Court
Certainty of Incarceration
Length of Incarceration
There were a few referred youths who were sent to jail for a short period of time with no other
conditions. These juveniles were excluded from these percentages. Those included in these
incarceration percentages were either sent to state prison or were sent to a county jail with a
corresponding stayed prison sentence.
'There were eight youths for whom we could not ascertain the length of their disposition.
length of sentence they received. By comparing the commitment
rates and sentence lengths between the two systems, we can assess the
efficacy of social control.
The juvenile court sentenced most (54%) of the delinquents to
some type of long-term juvenile correctional facility.10 2 The court
sentenced an additional one-fifth (20%) of the retained juveniles to
some type of short-term local program, in-patient treatment facility,
work camp, or ranch. The court placed on probation 12% of youths
who did not receive sentences that resulted in out-of-home placement
or correctional confinement, and imposed conditions such as a fine,
letter of apology, work squad, day treatment program, or stayed sen-
102 The court committed virtually all (51%) of these youths to long-term juvenile institu-
tions such as the Hennepin County Home School-Alpha program, County Home School-
Sex Offender program, the State Training Schools at Red Wing or Sauk Center, or to out-
of-state long-term placements such as Glen Mills in Pennsylvania. The court sentenced the
remaining 3% to one of these facilities and included an additional stayed commitment to
another correctional institution in their disposition.
Percent Incarcerated Percent Incarcerated
Of all Referred Youth N=215- Of all Retained Youth N=1 15
82% 54%
Of all Convicted Youth N=209' Of all Adjudicated Youth N=99
85% 63%
Convicted on Presumptive Adjudicated on Presumptive
Offense N=98' Offense N=40
93% 65%
Convicted on Non-Presumptive Adjudicated on Non-Presumptive
Offense N=1I 1 Offense N=59
78% 61%
Median Sentence Length Median Disposition Length'
Convicted to Prison orJail on Adjudicated and Sent to
Presumptive Offense N=88' Correctional Facility on
Presumptive Offense N=23
966 days 266 days
Convicted to Prison or Jail on Adjudicated and Sent to
Non-Presumptive Offense N=83" Correctional Facility on Non-
Presumptive Offense N=31
134 days 182 days
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tence to a correctional facility. The remaining 14% of the retained
juveniles had charges dismissed.
Of the 215 certified youths, the criminal courts sentenced 82% to
a local or state correctional facility. The adult court can sentence cer-
tified youths to state prison where the minimum sentence length is
one year or longer or to county jails where the maximum sentence
length is one year. However, the criminal courts also ordered stayed
prison terms for virtually all of the youths confined in local jails. If
those young offenders violated the terms of their probation following
release from jail, their stayed prison terms could be executed to ex-
tend their confinement. These two categories, prison and jail with a
prison stayed sentence, are the basis for the incarceration rates shown
in Table 5.103
Criminal courts incarcerated certified youths at much higher
rates than the juvenile courts. This was true even when the severity of
the offense was controlled. Eighty-five percent of the convicted re-
ferred youths were incarcerated whereas only 63% of the adjudicated
retained youths were placed in a correctional facility. The adult crimi-
nal courts incarcerated 93% of the youths convicted of a presumptive
offense, while the juvenile court imposed long-term confinement on
65% of the youths retained in juvenile court who were adjudicated for
a presumptive offense. The adult criminal courts confined 78% of
youths convicted of non-presumptive offenses in jail or prison,
whereas the juvenile court committed only 61% of non-presumptive
delinquents to a correctional facility. Thus, for both presumptive and
non-presumptive offenses, criminal courts incarcerated youths con-
victed as adults significantly more often than did the juvenile court.
Although the waiver process selects youths on the basis of seriousness,
the differences in rates of dismissal, conviction, and incarceration be-
tween the two systems are striking.'0 4
2. Length of Sentence
In addition to the differences in probabilities of conviction and
certainty of confinement for juveniles and adults, we calculated the
actual lengths of sentences imposed on those youths incarcerated in
103 There were another 8% of referred youths who were sentenced to a county jail with
no corresponding stayed prison sentence; 7% received stayed prison sentences of confine-
ment coupled with other conditions of probation, such as restitution, community service,
random urinalysis, chemical dependency treatment, or psychological treatment; and finally
3% of the referred youths had all charges dismissed in criminal court.
104 The sentencing disparities that we report are more pronounced than those found in
Fagan's comparison of sentencing of violent youths in both systems. See Fagan, supra note
7, at 116 ("Violent youths waived to and convicted in criminal court received more severe
sanctions [89%] than youths who remained in juvenile court [84%].").
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both justice systems. We defined the sentence length as the amount
of time a court ordered an offender committed or confined for the
offense(s) for which the prosecutor filed the reference motion.'0 5
Our analyses of juvenile and criminal court sentences replicate
the sentencing disparities reported in other studies. The lower sec-
tion of of Table 5 reports the median sentences imposed on youths
convicted as juveniles or adults for presumptive and non-presumptive
offenses. 10 6 Those youths convicted as adults of presumptive offenses
received sentences substantially longer than those imposed on
juveniles convicted of comparable offenses. By contrast, the juvenile
court-sentenced youths were found delinquent for non-presumptive,
property offenses for terms longer than their adult counterparts.
Because the adult and juvenile systems differ, it is difficult to di-
rectly compare sentence lengths in custodial facilities. Criminal
courts have two correctional confinement options-prison or jail-
while juvenile courts have only one incarceration option-long-term
correctional facilities. Criminal courts sentenced most youths con-
victed of presumptive offenses to prison (51%) and imposed a median
sentence length of 1,459 days-about four years. When they made a
mitigated downward departure from the presumptive sentences, they
confined those referred youths for a median sentence of one year-
the maximum allowed for jail confinement. Table 5 averages these
two sentencing options for certified youths. By contrast, juvenile
courts sentenced youths retained and adjudicated for presumptive of-
fenses to median terms of incarceration of 266 days, or about nine
months. Thus, youths sentenced as adults either to prison or to jail
served substantially longer terms than their juvenile counterparts who
were adjudicated of comparable offenses.
For youths convicted as adults of non-presumptive offenses, crimi-
nal courts sentenced the vast majority (95%) to local jails for median
terms of 120 days, or about four months, and made aggravated, up-
ward departures to send youths convicted of non-presumptive offenses
105 The amount of time an offender actually serves in a correctional institution may
differ considerably from that which the court orders due to a myriad of reasons, such as
"good time," overcrowding, escape, termination, assault against a staff member, non-com-
pliance with treatment goals, and the like. The most complete information available about
the largest group of our offenders consisted of the length of placement ordered by the
court. We gathered information on the lengths of sentences from the adult court system
and from the juvenile court files in Hennepin County.
106 We used the sentence median rather than the mean, because the median is less
sensitive to extreme values than the average. Because criminal courts sentenced a few of
these youths to life in prison, we employed a statistic less affected by these extreme values.
Another method would be to remove cases with extreme values-statistical outliers. How-
ever, we did not choose this option because of the small number of cases.
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to prison in only four cases (5%). By contrast, the juvenile court in-
carcerated the thirty-one juveniles adjudicated delinquent for non-
presumptive offenses to median terms of 182 days, or about six
months. Transferred youths have a higher conviction rate and a
higher certainty of incarceration for all types of offenses than youths
retained in juvenile jurisdiction. Youths sentenced in adult court also
receive substantially longer incarcerative sentences for presumptive
offenses than retained juveniles, but this is not the case for non-pre-
sumptive offenses. The juvenile courts imposed longer sentences on
less serious property offenses than did the criminal court.
3. Recidivism
Do waiver policies or criminal sentencing strategies reduce subse-
quent recidivism by offenders? Because we individually tracked the
subsequent criminal careers of each youth against whom prosecutors
filed a first reference motion between 1986 and 1992, we constructed
an accurate record of the subsequent official delinquent and criminal
justice responses for this group of serious young offenders. We coded
as recidivism all offenses that occurred after the offense for which the
prosecutor filed the initial reference motion. Although other studies
use rearrests as an indicator of recidivism,1 07 we used a more conserva-
tive definition of recidivism-actual adjudications or convictions.
We defined "street time" as two full years of non-incarceration
time following the sentence or disposition on the motioned offense,
allowing a standardized opportunity for new crime. We excluded
youths motioned in 1992 since data collection stopped in 1993, and
also excluded 10% of youths in our data who because of their prison
times did not have two or more years at risk to commit a new crime.
This means our recidivism levels are under-estimates of the recidivism
level for the referred youths. Assessing the recidivism within a two
year "window of opportunity" following sentencing and release stan-
dardizes the length of time available for all remaining juveniles. In
this analysis, post-reference motion conviction or adjudication for any
subsequent offense constituted recidivism. Using this conservative
definition of recidivism, over half (52%) of the youths who had an
opportunity to commit additional crimes did so. These reconviction
recidivism levels fall within the broad range of re-conviction recidi-
107 See, e.g., ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, RECIDIVISM OF YOUNG PAROLEES
(1987); LYNN GOODSTEIN & HENRY SONTHEIMER, A STUDY OF THE IMPAGr OF 10 PENN-
SYLVANIA RESIDENTIL PLACEMENTS ON JUVENILE RECIDMSM (1987); PATRICIA A. STEELE ET"
AL., UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH SERVICES (1991).
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Table 6
- NEW ADJUDICATION OR CONVICTIONS WITHIN Two YEARS
"STREET TIME" - N=266*
REFERRED RETAINED
N=164 N=102
No NEW CRIME 42% 58%
NEW CRIME 58% 42%
TYPE OF NEW OFFENSES
Person Felonies 35% 87%
Property Felonies 50% 26%
Drug Felonies 7% 16%
Misdemeanor level 7% 21%
NUMBER OF NEW OFFENSES
Four or more Felonies 25% 19%
Three Felonies 18% 16%
Two Felonies 21% 14%
One Felony 29% 30%
Misdemeanor level 7% 21%
* This excludes juveniles motioned in 1992 who did not have a full two years of time before data
collection was complete. It also excludes juveniles who were incarcerated for the full two years
(or more) following their conviction on the present offense.
vism levels reported in other studies of juvenile recidivists. s08 Within
the two year window following the initial reference motion offense,
there were no statistically significant differences in recidivism levels
between members of different racial groups. Fifty percent of the Afri-
can-American youths recidivated, as did 52% of the white youths, and
60% of the youths of the other minority group.
Finally, we compared the recidivism levels of those youths waived
to adult criminal court with those youths over whom the juvenile
court retained jurisdiction. A larger proportion of certified youths
committed new offenses within two years than did those who re-
108 See, e.g., BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 107 (national study completed in 1987 found a
rearrest recidivism rate of 47% in the two years following prison incarceration for 17-22
year olds); JOHN C. STEIGER & CARY DIZON, REHABILITATION, RELEASE AND REOFFENDING: A
REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CAREERS OF THE DIVISION OFJUVENILE REHABILITATION "CLASS OF
1982" (1991) (sample of 926 males released from Washington state division of juvenile
rehabilitation in 1982 shows 68% reconvicted within two years, and 53% committed at least
one violent offense); Ted Palmer & Robert Wedge, Californias Juvenile Probation Camps:
Findings and lmplications, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 234 (1989) (sample of 2,885 youths released
from "probation camps," 65% reconvicted within two years); OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FORJUVENILE OFFENDERS 64 (Feb. 1995)
(comprehensive assessment of recidivism rates in Minnesota's juvenile correctional institu-
tions reporting that "between 53% and 77% of male juveniles . . . received new delin-
quency petitions or were arrested as adults within two years. The percentage ofjuveniles
who were adjudicated as delinquent or convicted as adults ranged from 88% to 62% for
programs serving males."); Id. at 113-15 (summarizingjuvenile recidivism studies in other
jurisdictions).
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mained in the juvenile justice system. Nearly three-fifths (58%) of the
youths referred by juvenile court for criminal prosecution as adults
committed an additional crime, compared with 42% of those who re-
mained in juvenile court (p=.009). There are several possible expla-
nations of the differences in recidivism levels in the two systems. First,
because juvenile courts emphasized youths' total record of offending,
including the prior treatment attempts to make certification deci-
sions, they used a valid and reliable tool with which to identify high
base-rate career criminals who had a greater probability of subsequent
recidivism. Thus, the discretionary certification process did a reason-
ably good job of identifying the most chronic and prolific offenders
within the population of serious offenders. Secondly, the adult incar-
ceration experience may better train further criminality than the juve-
nile correctional experience. Thirdly, some might attribute the lower
recidivism levels among the retained juvenile population to the "effec-
tiveness of treatment" within the juvenile correctional system. How-
ever, the population selection biases inherent in the waiver process
and the absence of a control group make it difficult to attribute the
differences in recidivism rates between the juvenile and adult groups
to "treatment" effects. On the other hand, if legislatures and courts
intend to deter youths from committing additional offenses by sub-
jecting those who persist in delinquency to the more severe punish-
ment of the adult criminal justice system, our data indicate that they
are not achieving that goal.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This study presents a complete and comprehensive analysis of the
judicial waiver process and juvenile/criminal court sentencing poli-
cies. Our research improves on previous studies in a number of im-
portant respects. The quality of our data enable us to use multivariate
analytic techniques to disaggregate the factors that lead juvenile
courts to refer some youths to criminal court and retain jurisdiction
over others. Logistic regression is specifically designed for analyses
employing a dichotomous dependent variable-refer or retain. More-
over, we refined the specification of the dependent variable to analyze
judicial waiver decisions the first time prosecutors file a reference mo-
tion against ajuvenile, because courts' reactions to second and subse-
quent motions differ substantially.109 We collected considerable
delinquency and criminal data for motioned youths from sources
outside of Hennepin County when necessary and, therefore, have
109 See Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 97, at 166-67 (juvenile courts are much more likely
to transfer youths against whom prosecutors file subsequent reference motions).
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completed a better delinquency picture of more mobile youths. Addi-
tionally, because we also collected information about these youths'
prior program exposures and exhaustion of placement options, we
demonstrate the salience of prior dispositions as an operational indi-
cator of "amenability to treatment."
Our analyses also examine the influence of court processes on
waiver decisions by exploring the ways in which juvenile court judges
affect waiver decisions. Within the same urban county and court, the
various judges decided the cases of similarly-situated offenders signifi-
cantly differently. These judicial differences influenced both the
characteristics of youths waived or retained, and the subsequent
sentences imposed on them as juveniles or adults.
Our analyses also document the crucial role that probation
recommendations and psychological evaluations play in the "individu-
alized" waiver process and outcomes; probation officers' and psychol-
ogists' recommendations to the court to retain or refer a youth
significantly affect the eventual judicial waiver decision. More impor-
tantly, the statistical model including recommendations from court
service personnel allowed better predictions of both categories of
juveniles, referred and retained, but substantially improved the pre-
diction of youths who were retained.
Future waiver studies should include variables that tap various
court process indicators. Clearly, the judge who presides overjuvenile
waiver issues makes a difference, as do the recommendations provided
by probation officers and clinical evaluators.
We followed and compared the subsequent sentences that these
youths received as juveniles or as adults. Referred youths were incar-
cerated at a higher rate than retained youths, regardless of whether
the conviction was for a presumptive or non-presumptive crime.
Youths tried and convicted as adults for violent crimes for which the
Sentencing Guidelines presume commitment -to prison received
sentences dramatically longer than did their juvenile counterparts
convicted of similar offenses. However, for youths adjudicated of non-
presumptive offenses, the juvenile courts imposed longer sentences
than did the criminal courts for most young adult offenders. Thus,
for non-violent offenders, the lack of integration between juvenile
waiver criteria and criminal court sentencing practices perpetuate the
"punishment gap" and allows chronic property offenders to "fall be-
tween the cracks." Both types of disparities for similarly-situated of-
fenders-longer adult sentences for violent offenders and longer
juvenile sentences for property offenders-occurred because the two
systems lack a coherent sentencing policy that spans both.
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